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Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law1 
 
Abstract 
 
The patent system is built on the premise that exclusion leads to innovation. But a mounting 
body of evidence calls into question the assumption that “innovation by exclusion” – innovation 
based on excluding rivals– is the only, or even primary, way innovation happens today: nearly 
50% of manufacturers got the idea for their most important new product from an outside source 
that shared it with them, 45-60% of patentees acquire patents to access the technology of others, 
and over 1,300 companies, including five of the ten top holders of patents, have pledged to share 
their patents with others. But because of the patent system’s traditional focus on exclusion, 
policymakers have paid less attention to how patents can better support the diffusion of 
technology through mechanisms such as disclosure, transfer, waiver, and the pursuit of freedom 
to operate. This paper addresses this gap by exploring in depth the way that the patent system can 
encourage the diffusion of technology between rivals and innovators, revealing a surprising 
number of overlooked levers within the patent system for encouraging innovation.  
 
For example, making it easier to place inventions in the public domain through effective 
defensive publication, encouraging greater disclosure of patent-product relationships through the 
marking requirement, and changing the default for provisional applications to being open rather 
than closed, and for utility applications to publish upon filing, rather than after an 18-month 
delay, but with the right of inventors to opt-out of this default, would enhance patent disclosure 
by enabling technical information and permissions to use them to be available earlier to the 
world. Improving reporting and discovery of patent information, including ownership, 
availability for licensing, licensing status in the case of publicly funded inventions in accordance 
with existing law, patent licenses, and standards commitments, could boost markets for 
technology. Making it easier to waive patent rights and rely on waivers of patent rights, through 
the creation of a government registry of patent rights, and creating, e.g. an “open” or “defensive 
only” option that allows patentees to pay discounted maintenance fees in exchange for promising 
to use their patents only defensively, or to give up certain rights, akin to “license of right” 
schemes in the UK and Germany, would increase freedom to operate. As innovation increasingly 
takes place in open and closed modes, and often both, the patent system, by offering more ways 
for patentees to decide the fate of their inventions, can increase its relevance to “all of the above” 
types of innovation.  
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Introduction  
 
On June 12, 2014, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, published a blog post, “All Our Patent 
Belong To You.”2 In it, he announced that Tesla would “open source” its patents and make them 
freely available.3 The real competition was not the “small trickle” of non-Tesla electric cars, but 
the “enormous volumes of gasoline-powered cars being sold every day.” 4 By making its 
technology available to all, the company hoped to advance electric vehicle technology, to benefit 
all.5   
Like the meme that inspired the post’s name,6 the announcement engendered admiration, 
imitation, and confusion. Was Musk’s move altruistic, about saving the planet, or shrewd, about 
driving adoption of Tesla’s technology to achieve market dominance?7 Was it a marketing 
gimmick, or a naïve and self-destructive act, “reduc[ing] the value of the embedded option that is 
the primary foundation of the Tesla valuation,” as one investor claimed?8  
Why the strong response? It’s because we’re used to thinking that excluding rather than 
including rivals in the practice of one’s technology, leads to innovation.9 The Constitution 
enshrines this idea, authorizing Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
                                                          
2 Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA MOTORS BLOG (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (last visited _______). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 “All your base are belong to us,” which is a poor “Engrish” translation of a Japanese phrase meaning “we have 
taken over every last one of your bases,” that was featured in the introduction to a Japanese video game called Zero 
Wing. See Explanation of the Phrase “All your base are belong to us.” ASKVILLE BY AMAZON,  
http://askville.amazon.com/meant-phrase-base-belong-humorous-couldn%E2%80%99t-
meaning/AnswerViewer.do?requestId=2265435 (last visited______). 
7 Serguei Netessine & Karan Girotra, Tesla Goes Big, Not Home, HARV. BUS. R. (June 17, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/06/tesla-goes-big-not-home/ (last visited ______). 
8 Technology Equity Strategies, Did Tesla’s Actions in Detroit Put its Patents in the Public Domain? Why Investors 
Should Worry, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 15, 2015), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2918086-did-teslas-actions-in-
detroit-put-its-patents-in-the-public-domain-why-investors-should-worry?page=2 (last visited _____). 
9 The role of exclusion in the patent system has been the subject of a number of recent scholarly articles, see, e.g., 
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 
(2013) (articulating the concept of an excludability continuum); Oscar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion 
in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) (examining the benefits of limiting patent law’s broad exclusion to actual 
copying, as in copyright law); Adam Mosoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
321 (2009) (using a historical lens to examine the “exclusion concept” in patent law, or the right to exclude, as 
distinct from the larger set of “exclusive rights” traditionally associated with property that also include the positive 
rights of use and possession). 
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securing [] to [] Inventors the exclusive right to their [] Discoveries.”10 As the Supreme Court 
has added, “the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others.”11 (emphases added) The 
importance of exclusion is deeply engrained in property theory – providing owners with the 
incentive to preserve and utilize property more efficiently.12  
Tesla’s move turns this logic on its head. Instead of discouraging imitators, it’s creating 
them. Instead of excluding rivals, Tesla’s patents are diffusing its technology to them, and also 
serving to pave the way for Tesla’s use of its rivals’ patents, spurring further innovation. It 
appears to be working. Following the announcement, BMW, Nissan and Tesla, who together 
make 80% of the world’s electric-car batteries,13 were in talks about collaborating on global 
vehicle-charging standards.14 Later, Toyota announced that it would open its hydrogen-car 
patents.15 Then, the LG group announced that it would share its 29,000 patents, to small and 
medium-sized companies, and make another 3,058 freely available to startups.16 The sharing has 
spread beyond electric cars. Panasonic has moved to open up its source code, technology and 
patents in order to expedite R&D about the ‘Internet of Things.’17 A branch of the conglomerate 
Daweoo will share patents and knowhow relating to liquefied natural gas (LNG) engine 
technology with local entrepreneurs, and a number of Korean firms, including Samsung, 
Hyundai Motors, Lotte and have announced plans to open open innovation hubs.18 Companies 
like Facebook19 and Bistream20 have announced that they are developing technology in the open 
in areas like 3D printing, Bitcoin, and drones, engaging in massive sharing of what otherwise 
would be proprietary technology.  
                                                          
10 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
11 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). (“a patent...consists altogether in the right to 
exclude.”) 
12 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R. 347, 356 (1967) (“an owner, by 
virtue of his power to exclude others...[has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently”), and infra Part I.A. 
13 Id. 
14 Netessine & Girotra, supra note __.  
15 Sebastian Blanco, Toyota Follows Tesla, Makes Hydrogen Patents Open Source, AUTOBLOG (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:30 
PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2015/01/05/toyota-follows-tesla-makes-hydrogen-patents-open-source/ (last visited 
______). 
16 Jack Ellis, LG has as Much to Gain from its Open Innovation Drive as Korea’s SMEs, IAM (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=c4010b69-e529-48ce-b83f-dc2bce3d763c (last visited ____). 
17 http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=0a884580-e30f-4d5a-a827-786dd0b10316 
18 Id. 
19 http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/open-sourcing-cars-and-computers/?_r=0 
20 http://www.coindesk.com/blockstream-open-source-code-sidechains/ 
4 
 
 
But while notable, Tesla’s move to share technology was not original. Patent licensing is 
an old and well-known way for permitting others –exclusively and nonexclusively– to practice 
one’s technology, for money.21 Defensive patenting – holding patents in order to facilitate 
freedom to operate, but without the exchange of money – is practiced by an estimated half of 
patent holders.22 Others have opened up their technology without strings. When a Volvo 
engineer invented the three-point seatbelt in 1959, the company dedicated the invention to the 
public, for the safety of all.23 At the turn of the 18th century, Benjamin Franklin refused to patent 
what came to be later known as the Franklin stove, writing, “as we enjoy great advantages from 
the invention of others, we should be glad for an opportunity to serve others by any invention of 
ours.”24  
Across industries, contexts, and settings, modern examples abound of creative people 
coming up with ideas and, rather than practicing them exclusively, allowing and in some cases 
even inducing others to adopt them.  
For example, Lego Mindstorms, kits that can be used to create programmable robots, 
were designed in a lab at MIT, not in a toy factory in Denmark.25 Magic Erasers are made of a 
material originally marketed for soundproofing and insulation by the German company BASF.26 
Recently, companies like Google, DuPont, IBM, GE, and Pfizer have taken steps to share their 
technology with others.27 The Linux Defenders program creates “defensive patent publications” 
in an attempt to put open source technologies into the public domain.28  
 
                                                          
21 http://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/Documents/BHR870102.pdf 
22 See infra, Figure 1 and accompanying cites.   
23 Tony Borroz, Strapping Success: The 3-Point Seatbelt Turns 50, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/2009/08/strapping-success-the-3-point-seatbelt-turns-50/ (last visited ____). 
24 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 215 (1791) 
25 Lego Success Built on Open Innovation, IDEA CONNECTION, http://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovation-
success/Lego-Success-Built-on-Open-Innovation-00258.html (last visited _____). 
26 Larry Huston & Nabil Sakkab, Connect and develop, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 58 (2006). 
27 See PAI’s Comments on the New Strategy for American Innovation, PARTNERSHIP FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION 
(Sept. 23, 2014) (describing specific steps its member companies have taken to support open and collaborative 
innovation) and Part II.D., infra. 
28 About Linux Defenders, LINUX DEFENDERS, http://www.linuxdefenders.org/?page_id=167 (last visited ____). 
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These examples are indicative of broader trends. While innovation by exclusion – the use 
of patents to exclude rivals and others during the term of the patent – remains important, a 
mounting body of evidence challenges the assumption that the exclusive practice of one’s own 
patents is the only, or even primary way that patents encourage innovation today. Consider the 
following:  
- Nearly 50% of manufacturers report that their most important new product originated 
from an outside source, and that patented inventions were among the most valuable 
inputs;29  
- 45%-60% of companies say that accessing the technology of others motivates them to 
acquire patents;30  
- Biopharmaceutical companies signed $32B worth of licenses in 2014;31 and over a third 
of biotech startups license in technology.32  
 
The patent system has always supported the spread of technology through the greater 
availability of the patented product and placement of technology in the public domain when the 
patent has expired,33 and the transferability of patent rights from one innovator to another. 
However, as in other property systems,34 certain forms of patent sharing are not well-supported. 
If patent owners want to waive their rights unilaterally, for example they can do so by 
announcement, blog post, or other informal mechanism, but the legal status of their commitments 
is uncertain.35 Does Musk’s blog post represent his personal commitment or does it bind the 
company if he departs? What if Tesla changes its mind, is bought, or goes bankrupt? The lack of 
answers to these questions has the potential to substantially limit the uptake of Tesla’s 
                                                          
29 Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen, & John P. Walsh, The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in 
American Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20264, 2014). 
30 See, infra, Figure 1, and related cites. 
31  Survey, The Boston Consulting Grp., 2014 Biopharmaceutical Partnering Survey (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.slideshare.net/TheBostonConsultingGroup/2014-biopharmaceutical-partnering-survey (reporting 559 
deals x $57M upfront deal value, slides 5 and 6). 
32 Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley 
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 255 (2009). 
33 Described supra, at Part _ (reference section in which Ordover is discussed) 
34 The importance of inclusion, and social uses of property has been discussed e.g. in THOMAS W. MERRILL & 
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is important not only to be able to 
exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to include other persons in the use and enjoyment of the 
thing….”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75 (1997) (“[U]nderstanding the social use of property . . . 
must be as fundamental to understanding property as understanding the way in which property excludes.”). See also 
Daniel Kelley, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014). 
35 For discussions of the challenges of enforcing patent promises, see Robert P. Merges & Jeffery M. Kuhn, 
Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, An, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance 
Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, __ UTAH L. REV___ (forthcoming 2015). 
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technology. Neither are there easy ways for innovators to put their technologies in the public 
domain and ensure that they won’t be patented by others, nor let the world know that their 
technologies are available for licensing.36  
As such, there is a risk that innovation by diffusion – innovation in which the invention, 
or other key input to the innovation process, is spread from one source to another– is happening 
less than would be socially optimal. The economic evidence already shows that, while patents 
are generally sought for exclusion, they are less important than other means, like lead-time and 
secrecy, for appropriating returns to innovation.37 As innovation becomes increasingly 
collaborative, spurred by a reduction in the cost of communication and computing and an 
increase in the technological complexity of products,38 there may be a significant opportunity to 
enlarge the innovation-inducing role of the patent system by enhancing its support for 
collaboration, with profound social consequences as well.39  
Part I explores the theory, doctrine, and evidence regarding the role of exclusion in the 
patent system and how it exclusionary and diffusionary motives. Part II explores non-
exclusionary modes of innovation, and “innovation by diffusion,” which is based on the sharing 
of ideas. Three case studies– of open innovation in manufacturing based on important work done 
by Ashish Arora and his colleagues, of markets for technology, and of defensive patenting– 
illustrate the growing significance of innovation by diffusion, and the equally important role of 
the patent system in supporting these forms of innovation. Part III articulates a novel “diffusion” 
framework and applies it to three diffusive mechanisms of the patent system – disclosure, 
transfer, and freedom to operate.  
Building upon Parts II and III, Part IV discusses largely overlooked ways that the patent 
system could be reformed to support the greater diffusion of technical information and 
permissions. For example, removing legal barriers to reading patents, making it easier to place 
inventions in the public domain through effective defensive publication, encouraging greater 
                                                          
36 Discussed infra, at Part III.D. Accord Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, _____ (emphasizing the 
importance of timing to the disclosure of such information), 
37 See infra, Table 1 (showing lead time and sales/service as ranking above patents as means of appropriation). 
38 Described, e.g., in Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, OECD (2004) 
http://www.oecd.org/science/sci-tech/24508541.pdf, at 16. 
39 Discussed infra, at Part II.D. 
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disclosure of patent-product relationships through the marking requirement, and changing the 
default for provisional patent applications to be open rather than closed, and for utility 
applications to publish upon filing, rather than after an 18-month delay, but with the right of 
inventors to opt-out of this default, would enhance patent disclosure. Improving reporting and 
discovery of patent information, including ownership, availability for licensing, licensing status 
in the case of publicly funded inventions in accordance with existing law, patent licenses, and 
standards commitments, could boost markets for technology. Making it easier to waive patent 
rights and rely on waivers of patent rights, through the creation of a government registry of 
patent rights, and creating a “freedom to operate” option that allows patentees to pay discounted 
maintenance fees in exchange for promising to use their patents only defensively, akin to 
“license of right” schemes in the UK and Germany, would increase freedom to operate. Part V 
concludes. 
Part I: The Role of Exclusion in the US Patent System  
A patent is a legal instrument that bestows a set of exclusive rights to its owner upon 
successful application to the patent office. It is also a social bargain.40 Society gets the 
innovation, and, in the patent document, a complete description of a novel invention that others 
can learn from.41 This, all in exchange for one thing – a set of rights to exclude others. Supported 
by this basic legal framework, the patent system has created opportunities to foster innovation 
through exclusion and diffusion. In this first part of this paper, I discuss the role of exclusion in 
the patent system, in theory and in practice, to be followed by an exploration of the role of the 
patent system in facilitating innovation through diffusion.  
Granting patents has always been associated with taking away the rights of others. The 
Venetian Patent Act of 1474, the first of its kind,42 promised patentees that it would be 
"forbidden into every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further device 
conforming with [the patented device]....”43 The first American patent law gave patentees “the 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain 
that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for 
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”) 
41 Penrose & Machlup, supra note ___, at 10-11. 
42 Fritz Machlup, Report to Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm.: An 
Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).  
43 Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378, 379 (1960). 
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sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be 
used, the said invention or discovery.”44 The statute conferred the full suite of property rights – 
to use and possess, as well to exclude.45 However in the 20th century, property theory, under the 
influence of legal realists and prominent thinkers like Wesley Hohfeld, evolved to support the 
concept of property as a “bundle of rights.”46 The right to exclude (one stick) became separable 
from the other sticks of use, possession and enjoyment.47  
Today, the law gives patent owners the rights to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, and importing the patented invention.48 Many aspects of the patent 
system, both in theory and in practice, flow from this exclusionary focus. 
A. Patent Law’s Exclusionary Focus  
1. Theory 
Patent law’s exclusionary bent follows from patents as a form of property. According to 
Locke’s oft-cited “Labour Theory of Property,” man has a natural property right over his person, 
and by extension, the fruits of his labor.49  When man takes from nature, and mixes his labor 
with it, he removes it from the common state and “excludes the common right of man” from it.50 
Natural rights justifications have been applied to intellectual property, which is shaped out of 
facts, ideas, and scientific, technical and other insights that belong to all,51 though not without 
criticism.52 Securing exclusive rights to inventors, who serve society through their creations, is 
also fair and just;53 preventing others from free-riding off the work of inventors.54  
                                                          
44 Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793). 
45 See e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (defining property as that which “consists in the free 
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions”); see Mosoff, supra note ___ at 350-360 (tracing the history of 
such conceptions of property). 
46 For a description of this evolution, see Kelley, supra note ___, at 863-865. 
47 Id.  
48 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (enacted as part of the 1952 Patent Act).  
49 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ___(1689) 
50 Id.  
51 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (2011). 
52 Chief among is these is the characteristic of ideas as cumulative, making it difficult to delineate the fruits that are 
directly attributable to one’s labor, and the inability of independent inventors to practice their own inventions. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4-
5 (2003).  
53 See, e.g. Machlup & Penrose, supra note ___, at 10.  
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The dominant, utilitarian account of the system justifies patents on the basis that 
exclusion incents investment in the creation of new knowledge.55  Knowledge has properties that 
distinguish it from tangible property – first that it is nonrival; as Thomas Jefferson explained in a 
famous letter, “he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening 
mine.” Second, knowledge is “nonexcludable,” or in Jefferson’s words, made by nature 
“expansible over all space…and, like the air…incapable of confinement or exclusive 
appropriation.” 56 These “public good” characteristics mean that the gains associated with new 
knowledge can’t be reserved to its producers.57 Protection against imitators, is necessary because 
“he who has no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow.”58 The right to exclude 
hedges against the underproduction of knowledge.59   
Finally, exclusive rights are thought to promote the efficient use of resources, once 
created. According to Demsetz, exclusive rights in property provide incentives to maintain and 
improve property, in response to market signals that reflect social welfare.60 Patents also create 
“prospects” that facilitate efficient investments in innovation, Kitch has written.61 For inventions 
that can be easily imitated, they enable the expenditures needed to bring the product to market.62   
2. Motives to Patent  
The exclusionary thrust of the US patent system is reflected not only in theory, but also in 
practice. When asked why they patent, companies consistently answer, to prevent copying and 
block patenting by others. Figure 1 shows the responses of two surveys. 96% of the 1,474 R&D 
managers surveyed by Cohen and his colleagues indicated that preventing copying motived the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
54 See, e.g. Sigrid Sterckx, The Moral Justifiability of Patents, 13 J. EUR. ETHICS NETWORK 249, 255 (2006) (“The 
establishment of a patent system is justified because it would be unfair to allow people a ‘free ride’ at the expense of 
others who apply themselves to the act of inventing.”)  
55 SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38 (2004) (“Intellectual property protection gives 
innovators an incentive to invest in new knowledge.”). 
56 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
175, 181 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1855). 
57 Joseph E.Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308 (1999). 
58 Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, VOL. III 71. 
59 Stiglitz, supra note ___, at 311. 
60 Demsetz, supra note ___, at 354-459.  
61 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 271–75 (1977). 
62 Id. 
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acquisition of their last product innovation patent,63 while 82% of respondents elected the next 
highest-ranked answer, the prevention of patenting by others, or “blocking.”64 86% of the 7,933 
American inventors surveyed by Nagaoka and Walsh65 selected as a reason to patent, enhancing 
exclusive exploitation of the invention, the top answer, followed by “blocking,” which was 
selected as by 70% of respondents.66Likewise, among reasons for getting patents, the Berkeley 
Patent Survey, of young technology firms, found that “prevent[ing] others from copying our 
                                                          
63 Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), at Figs. 7-
8. 
64 Patent blocking can be motivated by a desire to exclude competitors from a particular area, or done in order to 
facilitate cross-licensing and create greater freedom to operate. Id. at 21-23. Preventing copying and blocking were 
the top answers, respectively, for process invention patents too. Id. at Figs. 7-8 
65 Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of Patents in Japan and the U.S.: Major 
Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey, RIETI, IAA (Mar. 2009) (describing the results of a survey 
of inventors of “triadic patents” – patents whose applications were filed in both the Japanese Patent Office and the 
European Patent Office and granted in the United States Patent).  
66 See id. at Figure 13. 
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products or services” was the most important reason for getting patents.67
 
3. Doctrine – Default to Exclusion 
The surveys support the theory – that the purpose of patents is to guard against imitation. 
So does legal doctrine, primarily by securing to owners of valid and infringed patents with rights 
to exclude. These rights are only meaningful if they cannot be easily avoided by making slight 
changes to the product or “designed-around.”68 As a result, patent law features a “broad 
exclusionary rule.”69 This means that a successful applicant for a patent injunction (not all 
                                                          
67 Graham et al. supra note__ at Figs. 2-3; Accord Gaétan de Rassenfosse et al., Motivations to Patent: Empirical 
Evidence from an International Survey, at Table 1 (reporting that, “to prevent imitation by competitors,” was the top 
motivator for getting patents among 604 respondents to a survey sent to randomly selected applicants of European 
Patent Office (EPO) patents). 
68 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, n47 (1997) 
(describing the design-around of patents as the use of the claims of a patent “as a guide for deciding what to avoid in 
producing a competing product.”) 
69 Liivak, supra note ___, at 1662. 
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applicants are)70 can exclude others from practicing not just what the patentee herself did, but 
what she describes and claims in the patent, even as that scope changes and enlarges over time 
and comes to encompass technology that did not exist at the time of the invention.71  
A preference for exclusion also means that a product that incorporates thousands of 
patents may be excluded on the basis of the infringement of a single one.72 “Patent hold-up,” 
when the patentee has undue bargaining power based not on the value of the patented 
technology, but the high cost of replacing it, once it has been embedded into a product,73 has also 
concerned policymakers.74 “Proportionality” concerns in property are not unique to patent law. 
As Nozick famously asked “If own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea…do I thereby 
come to own the sea?”75  
Patent law’s default to exclusion has created other paradoxes. Though patent law requires 
inventors to put details about their inventions in their patents, it discourages others from reading 
these details. Under the doctrine of “willfulness,” infringers owe up to triple damages when they 
act “despite an objectively high likelihood,”76 of infringement, and that the “objectively-defined 
risk [] was... known.” 77 Actual knowledge of the patent enhances the penalty for infringement.78 
This leads many to avoid reading patents,79 in effect “undermin[ing] the disclosure function that 
is at the foundation of the patent system.”80  
                                                          
70 Chien and Lemley, supra note __, at 268 
71 See Kitch, supra note __, at 268 (providing an illustration of this breadth based on a fat separation process); see 
also Kevin Collins, [add cite]. 
72 See, e.g. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdups, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1,6 (2011). (discussing the harm to consumers that comes from blocking many lawful features, and among 
them, one infringing one) 
73 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) 
74 See, e.g. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 137-212 (2011) 
75  Nozick, supra note ___, at 175. See also, William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, HARVARD LAW, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iptheory.html (discussing Lockean concerns about proportionality and 
fairness) 
76 See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
77 Id. 
79 Compare, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (describing the practice among 
component technology companies and researchers of ignoring patents), with Lisa Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 565 (2012) (finding that few academic nanotechnology researchers 
surveyed indicated that they worried that reading patents could have negative legal effects); see also infra Part 
III.B., regarding the reading of patents across different industry settings, despite willfulness risks.  
79 Compare, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (describing the practice among 
component technology companies and researchers of ignoring patents), with Lisa Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 565 (2012) (finding that few academic nanotechnology researchers 
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B. Structural Limits to Excluding 
In theory and by design, then, the patent system offers exclusion as a way for inventors to 
recoup investments in R&D and commercialization.  But how does it fare in practice? For a 
patent to prevent or deter copying of the patent owner’s product, the stars must align in several 
ways. First, the patent must be in force at the same time that it is being practiced. The match 
between patent and infringer’s product must be discernable. The patent must be credibly 
enforceable – which, in turn, turns on the owner’s willingness and ability to bring a suit. All of 
these facts influence the extent to which patents can be used for their intended purpose, to 
exclude. In the paragraphs that follow I describe the structural limits to using patents to exclude. 
1. Timing  
Once issued, a patent gives its owner up to 20 years of exclusivity starting from the time 
of filing.81 As a legal instrument, then, patents naturally support the “linear model of 
innovation,” according to which a single actor conceives of and takes all the steps necessary to 
bring an idea to market.82 Invention, the conceptualization of a new and nonobvious product or 
process, starts the process.  Innovation, taking an invention, and developing, improving, adopting 
and commercializing it follows. Once there is a product, it can be sold and diffused through the 
market.83  
The exclusive rights of patents can hasten progress along several stages of the linear 
model.84 But innovation is often much more chaotic and unpredictable.85 Novel ideas may prove 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
surveyed indicated that they worried that reading patents could have negative legal effects); see also infra Part 
III.B., regarding the reading of patents across different industry settings, despite willfulness risks.  
80 Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri. Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 
1125 (2003). 
81 US Patents are generally eligible for up to 20 years of protection, though extensions may be available to 
compensate for regulatory or processing delays. However, owners may also forgo protection by simply failing to 
pay their “maintenance fees,” which are required to keep their patents in force. Maintenance fees are due at 3 ½, 7 ½ 
and 11 ½ years after the patent has issued. Maintain Your Patent, USPTO, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited ____).  
82 See, e.g., Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 285-289. 
83 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES, A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
CAPITALIST PROCESS 149 (2d ed. 1947) (describing the three phases of innovation). 
84 Id. 
85 Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 283 (describing the view that innovation is a well-defined, predictable, 
homogeneous process, “serious[ly] mistake[n].”)  
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to be economic dead-ends.86 The path to the market often includes interruptions and delays. 35, 
153, 29 years, respectively, elapsed between the first patentability and commercialization of the 
television, jet engine, and helicopter.87 It took 264 years for the insight that scurvy, a common 
disease among sailors that caused gum decay and often, death, could be prevented by vitamin C, 
to fully diffuse.88 Many lives were lost in the interim. But the patent clock, once started, cannot 
be stopped, and the incentive to diffuse the invention may also get lost in the interim. Scholars 
have blamed the 20-year fixed patent-term as being too short to support the development, for 
example, of therapies to prevent or treat early stage cancer. 89  
2. Matching Products to Patents 
Even when patents are timely, they can only exclude when there is something to exclude. Yet 
the majority of patents is not practiced.90 Even when they are, they must be matched to products, 
a task that can be challenging. For example, it is easier to tell whether a competitor is selling a 
particular product than whether they are using a particular process, making product patents more 
effective than process patents for appropriating value from invention.91 Because the ease of 
detection is not necessarily correlated with social value, the comparative excludability of patents 
introduces potentially undesirable distortions into the innovation ecosystem.92 
 
3. Enforceability and Enforcement of Patents  
To exclude, patentees not only be able to detect infringement but also, have the resources 
and will to enforce their patents.  To enforce a patent is expensive,93 with reputational 
                                                          
86 Id. at 283 (contrasting the intellectual nature of invention with the economic nature of innovation); Michele 
Boldrin, & David K. Levine, Rent-Seeking and Innovation, 51 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 127 (2004) 
(calling the idea that pure or disembodied ‘‘ideas’’ have economic and productive value “patently false”). 
87 Kitch, supra note ___, at Table 1.  
88 Frederick Mosteller, Innovation and Evaluation 211 SCIENCE, No. 4485, 881, 882 (Feb. 27, 1981) 
89 Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin, & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?, (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19430, 2013). 
90 Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 276 (the “overwhelming majority” of patented inventions is never 
commercialized), accord Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341, 343. 
91 See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note __, at Table 1 reporting lower across the board numbers for process as opposed 
to product patents as sources of appropriability.). 
92 Syed & Kapczynski, supra note __, at 1942. 
93 Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Report of the Economic Survey I-129-I-132 (2013). 
(reporting that the average cost of a patent infringement suit where less than $1 million is at risk is $968,000 
inclusive of all costs, per side and more for higher value disputes). 
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consequences.94 Because a patent’s validity can be questioned even after it is granted, patentees 
subject their patents to attacks when they try to enforce – losing 42% of the time in court,95 and 
around 77% of the time, on all claims at issue, in certain proceedings before the USPTO.96 Given 
these expenses and odds, it’s no wonder the patent system is said to be characterized by 
“pervasive noncompliance and nonenforcement.”97  
 
C. Patents as Mechanisms of Appropriation 
None of the evidence reviewed thus far supports that patents are never effective at 
deterring imitation. In fact, the data shows that patentees believe the opposite, and are seeking 
patents to do so.98 The literature nonetheless identifies several limits to using patents as intended, 
as described above.  
  
                                                          
94 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 291 (describing the economics of patent 
enforcement).  
95 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (Figure 4) (2014). 
96 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 93 
(2014) (based on the first two years of adjudications). 
97 Rebecca Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 59 (2011). 
98 See supra, Part I.A.1.2. 
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Table 1: How Important are Patents, Relative to Other Mechanisms, for Appropriating or 
Protecting Competitive Advantages? (Relative Rank)  
 
The data on how patents are actually used, as compared to the reasons that patents are sought, 
reinforce these limits. A number of studies have probed the relative importance of patents to 
companies. These studies have generally found the answer to be, less important than other means 
of appropriation (Table 1) although with some industry variation. In the Berkeley Patent Survey, 
young biotechnology company respondents rated patents as more important than other forms of 
appropriation,103 however, Cohen’s survey in 2000 of companies found that in no industry were 
                                                          
99 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (1987), Table 1 and 792-793. (showing the mean ratings given to patents and 
other mechanisms for protecting products, based on a survey of 650 public companies with R&D expenses in excess 
of 1% or $35M). 
100 Cohen et al., supra note ___, at Fig.1 (showing the mean percentage of product innovations for which a variety of 
mechanisms, including patents, were considered effective). 
101 John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Documented in NSF Survey, INFOBRIEF 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING STATISTICS (Feb. 2012), Figure 2 (showing the share of 
businesses that reported that a form of intellectual property right was very or somewhat important, based on a survey 
of firms with R&D activity). 
102 Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note ___, at Fig. 11 (showing the share of survey respondents who rated the 
appropriation strategy highly). 
103 Graham et al, supra note ____ at Figure 1. 
Levin (1987)99  Cohen (2000)100  NSF 2008101 
(R&D firms) 
Nagaoka and Walsh 
(2010)102 
1. Sales/Service Efforts 1. Lead Time 1. Trade Secret  1. First Mover 
Advantage 
2. Lead time 2. Secrecy 2. Trademark 2. Complementary 
Manufacturing 
3. Learning 3. Complementary 
Manufacturing 
3. Copyright 3. Complementary 
Sales/Service 
4. Patents to prevent 
duplication 
4. Complementary  
Sales/Service 
4. Utility Patent 4. Secrecy 
5. Patents to secure 
royalties 
5. Patents 5. Design Patent 5. Patent 
Enforcement 
6. Secrecy 6. Other Legal   6. Collaboration 
      7. Product/Process 
complexity 
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patents more important than secrecy or lead-time, including drugs, basic chemicals, and  
miscellaneous chemicals.104 
D. Revisiting the Balance of Exclusion and Diffusion in the Patent System 
Taken together, the theory and evidence present an acknowledged paradox.105 According 
to the dominant, utilitarian rationale, the reason we have a patent system is to incent the 
cultivation and disclosure of innovation. The right to exclude – the only right that a patent holder 
gets – is the mechanism by which the system stimulates this innovation.  Because they think 
patents can deter copying, innovators file for patents. (Figure 1).   
But a funny thing can happen on the path between the patent office and the market. Many, 
likely most patented inventions aren’t ever commercialized. Existing products are often not 
covered by patents. And whether a competitor is actually infringing may be hard to detect, or not 
within a company’s interest or business plan to determine, and then act upon. And so, during the 
lifetime of a patent, the objective of excluding others with patents can recede, and other 
objectives can emerge, in importance.   
Tesla’s experience fits this pattern. Tesla originally got patents, “out of concern that the big 
car companies would copy our technology,”106 reinforcing the instinct shared by most 
innovators– to use patents to prevent imitation.107 However, over time, Tesla discovered “[w]e 
couldn’t have been more wrong. The unfortunate reality is the opposite: electric car programs [] 
at the major manufacturers are small to non-existent.”108 However, just because Tesla is 
abandoning the desire to prevent copying, it isn’t abandoning its patents. Instead, it is using them 
to encourage adoption of its technology and for defensive purposes.109 In the meantime, Tesla 
                                                          
104 Cohen et al, 2000, supra note ___ at Table 1 and 2. 
105 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005)  
(describing the “patent paradox” as the dramatic rise in “patent intensity—patents obtained per research and 
development dollar” …“even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished”); Bronwyn H. Hall and 
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study Of Patenting In The U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001) (studying the “patent paradox” of “the gap 
between the relative ineffectiveness of patents (as reported in surveys) and their widespread use”). 
106 See Musk, supra note __. 
107 See supra, Part I.A.1. 
108 See Musk, supra note __. 
109 Patent Pledge, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.teslamotors.com/about/legal (last visited ___) (defining what it 
means for a party to not act in good faith as asserting patents against Tesla, challenging Tesla patents, or knocking 
off Tesla’s trademark). 
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has also used its patents to secure financing.110 Though not the primary reason Tesla acquired 
patents, these non-exclusionary uses promote innovation at the company.   
In the next section I consider the economic importance of “innovation by diffusion,” which 
depends on the spread of technical knowledge from one setting to another, as another important 
way in which the patent system can support innovation. 
Part II: The Case for Supporting Innovation by Diffusion  
The innovation by exclusion story in which patents are used to exclude rivals fits well the 
“linear model of innovation” in which the stages of innovation happen within the boundaries of a 
single firm.111 But this model has been described as increasingly “less accurate.”112  
A. Defining Innovation by Diffusion  
If innovation doesn’t always follow a linear path, what path does it follow? In this Part, I 
explore nonexclusionary models of innovation, or what I call “innovation by diffusion.” What is 
“innovation by diffusion”? Diffusion is the spread of an idea, product, practice, or other cultural 
element as it disseminates or “takes off” throughout society.113 Or more precisely, “the process 
by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of 
a social system.”114 I define innovation by diffusion, then, as innovation in which the invention, 
or other key input to the innovation process, comes from an external source.  
As new innovations drive economic growth and promote social welfare, understanding the 
mechanisms and organization of innovation and its diffusion are of broad interest.115 An 
                                                          
110 Jack Ellis, Despite the patent ‘giveaway,’ Tesla has been Monetising its Portfolio All Along, IAM (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=b6ef62d3-99a7-4637-bea6-c696c61810b1 (last visited ____). 
111 Supra Part I.B.2; see also Benoît Godin, The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an 
Analytical Framework (Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics, Working Paper No. 30, 2005). 
112 See Arora et al., supra note __, at 2. 
113 See, e.g., Diffusion – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diffusion 
(defining diffusion as “the spread of cultural elements from one area or group of people to others by contact”); 
THOMAS W. VALENTE, NETWORK MODELS OF THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS [pincite needed] (1995) (defining the 
diffusion of innovation as “how ideas, products and opinions ‘take off’ and spread throughout society”). 
114 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (3d ed., The Free Press 1983), 5 (1962). 
115 Studies of innovation have not been limited to a single discipline, but attempted by scholars in a number of fields. 
As British economist Christopher Freeman has said “Innovation is far too important to be left to scientists and 
technologists. It is also far too important to be left to economists or social scientists.” See CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 309 (Penguin Books) (1997). For a description of this literature, see 
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extensive literature has considered the inputs to innovation provided by particular outside 
sources, for example universities,116 users,117 and customers.118 When these actors are not well-
positioned to commercialize their technologies, they must seek external partners to get the job 
done. Chesebrough’s work on “open innovation” explains how looking outside has become an 
imperative for commercializing firms as well.119 In this part I discuss three case studies of 
innovation by diffusion, and the role of patents in facilitating the spread of both technical ideas 
and the permission to use them. Although drawn from variety of contexts, these case studies 
share two characteristics. First, innovation is happening, not because the inventor retained 
exclusive rights, but the opposite – because the invention spread from one setting to another. 
And second, the patent system is facilitating this diffusion. 
B. Open Innovation in Manufacturing 
Open innovation is the use of inflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation and the 
use of outflows of knowledge to expand markets for the external use of innovation.120 It is the 
“antithesis of the traditional vertical integration model,” where the ideas that are developed come 
from within a firm.121  
In 2000, Proctor and Gamble (P&G), found itself in an innovation rut. R&D productivity 
remained flat even while innovation costs were increasing.122 Under the leadership of a new 
CEO, the company launched a new strategy, based on the insight that some of the company’s 
best new ideas came from connecting ideas across business lines.123 Insights from candles were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
id. and Bronwyn Hall, Innovation and Diffusion (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10212, 2004) 
(providing an overview of the determinants of diffusion of innovation). 
116 Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, Characteristics, and 
Financing, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 55 (1995). 
117 Eric Von Hippel, Lead Users: a Source of Novel Product Concepts, 32 MGMT. SCI. 791 (1986). 
118 For an overview, see, e.g. Jacques Bughin et al. The Next Step in Open Innovation, 4 MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 112 
(June 2008). 
119 HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM 
TECHNOLOGY (2005). 
120 Id., at 2. (defining open innovation as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively.”) 
121 Id. 
122 Huston & Sakkab, supra note ___, at 2. 
123 Id. 
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relevant to soap, and from soap (which is high in fat) to vegetable shortening.124 Under this new 
strategy, the company would look even further, beyond the boundaries of the firm, and retool its 
processes to increase ideas coming not “from” their labs, but “through” their labs, including from 
customers and other partners.125  
Based on their novel “connect-and develop” (C&D), versus the traditional “research-and-
development” (R&D), approach to innovation,126 P&G has reported increasing the share of its 
product portfolio with externally sourced key elements to 45% by 2006.127 One example is 
Magic Erasers, which were discovered by a technology entrepreneur within the firm who found a 
stain-removing sponge in a Japanese supermarket. This sponge was, in turn, based on a resin 
foam developed by German chemical company BASF and marketed for different uses, insulation 
and sound-proofing.128 Following this initial “discovery” the product was evaluated and 
launched in new markets, and then used as the basis of new products developed by P&G and 
BASF.129  
In the transformation of its approach to innovation, P&G took advantage of the same insight 
that the Lego Corporation did when it embraced open innovation – that “99.99 % of the world’s 
most talented individuals” do not work there.130 In Lego’s case they had the additional 
advantage, however, that this 99.9% “probably grew up with and continue to have a relationship 
with the Lego brand.”131 Lego’s turn to open innovation was driven in part by necessity – in the 
1990s, the company faced threats from the growing popularity of video games and the 
                                                          
124 Mark Dodgson, et al., The Role of Technology in the Shift Towards Open Innovation: The Case of Procter & 
Gamble, 36 R&D MGMT. 333, 337 (2006).  
125 See Huston & Sakkab, supra note __, at 2. 
126 See Dodgson et al., supra note __, at 337. 
127 See Huston & Sakkab, supra note __, at 3. 
128 See Dodgson et al., supra note __, at 337. 
129 Id. 
130 Stiven Kerestegian, Open Innovation at the LEGO Group, PIONEERS, http://pioneers.io/blog/2013/11/21/open-
innovation-lego-group/ (last visited ____).  
131 Id.; see also Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed Innovation, 2 INNOVATIONS 97 
(2007) (citing the maxim in business attributed to Sun co-founder Bill Joy, “No matter who you are, most of the 
smartest people work for someone else.”). 
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Internet.132 Lacking experience in interactive toys, they worked with outside partners to develop 
Lego Mindstorms – programmable bricks equipped with sensors.133  
Open innovation programs in the private and public134 sectors have blossomed in recent 
years. But until recently, it has been unclear whether or not these examples are at the periphery 
of mainstream innovation or indicative of broader trends.  
This question was addressed by Arora and his colleagues when they asked manufacturers 
about the extent to which they innovated, and their sources of their ideas.135 Probing the 
innovations of the 43% of firms that had recently innovated,136 their survey focused on “new to 
market” innovations, such as, in food, antioxidant chocolates; in chemicals, bio-solvents; in 
electronics, a new sort of LCD panel.137 The surveyors asked who originated the new to the 
market product. Strikingly, 49% of respondents reported that their most important new product 
had come from an outside source.138 Respondents then designated the source as being either a 
supplier, a customer, another firm in the industry, or a technology specialist, defined as either an 
independent inventor, a consultant or engineering service provider, or a university or government 
lab.139 While 53% of outside innovations came from customers, 37% of outside innovations were 
sourced from specialists, whose contributions were more economically significant.140 While only 
a quarter of outside inventions overall were patented, specialists were much more likely to patent 
their inventions.141   
                                                          
132 David Oliver & Johan Roos, Decision-Making in High-Velocity Environments: The Importance of Guiding 
Principles, 26 ORG. STUD. 889 (2005) 
133 Id.. 
134 The Obama Administration has embraced open innovation through prizes and challenges Between September 
2010 and February 2015, 72 federal agencies ran 390 challenge and prize competitions, spanning inventions ranging 
from super-fuel-efficient cars to quiet, practical, Green aircraft (see, e.g., Introduction to Challenge.gov, 
CHALLENGE.GOV, http://www.challenge.gov/about, & http://www.challenge.gov/list/ (list of competitions) (last 
visited March 7, 2015)). 
135 Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in 
American Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. w20264, 2014). 
136 Id., 3, 9-10. 
137 Id., Table 1. 
138 Id., Table 3. 
139 Id., 13-14. 
140 Id., 1. 
141 Id. at 16. 52% of independent inventor generated inventions, and 42% of university inventions, were patented. 
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These findings suggest that the diffusion of ideas and inventions across firms is having a 
sizeable effect on innovation, and that the patent system is playing an important role. It is 
reinforced by markets for technology, described next. 
C. Markets for Technology  
In a market for technology, an inventor or technology owner transfers her invention to 
another setting, by licensing, partnering, or otherwise contracting for it to be exchanged.142 The 
growth of such technology markets is another indicia of the economic significance of including 
rather than excluding others in the practice of a patent during its term. While markets for 
technology are not new,143 they have been growing faster than world GDP since the mid-
1990s. 144 The total value of technology transactions from 1985-1997 was about $27 billion per 
year, the equivalent of about 9% of total nondefense R&D spending in developed countries.145 
By 2002, the annual market for technology was about $66B in the US, and about $100B 
worldwide.146   
The bulk of technology transactions has been concentrated in a few sectors, namely 
chemicals, software, machinery, and engineering and professional services.147 In chemicals, the 
licensing of products and processes has been widespread, according to various strategies.148 Take 
the approach of BP Chemicals, for example. In an area where it is a market leader, acetic acid, it 
has licensed very selectively, into markets in which it would otherwise not be able to enter. But 
in an area characterized by more competition, polyethylene, it has licensed more extensively.149 
The biopharmaceutical industry has also had a long record of partnerships, signing an estimated 
                                                          
142 See Arora et al., MARKETS supra note __, at 78. (defining trade in technology as excluding organizational 
acquisitions (as in M&A), human capital, or products) 
143 Naomi Lamoreaux & Kenneth Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries, in LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS, AND COUNTRIES 19 (1999).  
144 Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Ideas For Rent: an Overview of Markets for Technology, 19 INDUSTRIAL 
AND CORPORATE CHANGE 775 (2010) (reporting that technology royalty payments have increased an average 10.7% 
per year from 1980 to 2003, faster than the growth in world GDP, based on OECD data). 
145 See Arora et al., supra note __, at ___. 
146 See Arora et al., supra note __, at __. 
147 See Arora et al., supra note __, at ___. 
148 Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, The Evolution of Industry Structure in the Chemical Industry, in 
CHEMICALS AND LONG TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH (1998). 
149 See Arora, supra note __, at ___. 
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$32B worth of licensing deals in 2014.150 In the semiconductor industry, the growth of fabless or 
chipless design companies has also created opportunities to license.151 
Universities have been an important source of technology. Earlier work estimates that 15% of 
new industrial products, including 31% of new pharmaceutical products, and 22% of new 
instrumentation products, could not have been introduced on time without university research.152 
Though the university research often does not originate the invention, it leads to it. For example, 
research on the organic chemical properties of silicon is credited with leading to the development 
of industrial silicones.153 Since 1980, when the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, making it easier for 
universities to patent their inventions,154 partnerships with universities have reportedly created 
over 4,000 startups.155 In 2012, university alliances reportedly led to $36.8 billion of net product 
sales at 70 startups, and employed 15,741 full-time employees.156 In 2003, universities originated 
330 startups, and 647 in 2012.157 
Patents can be instrumental in such partnerships, giving patentees something to trade, and a 
cheaper way to transact than trade secrets afford, due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure or 
unprovable theft.158 
D. Defensive Patenting Strategies 
A third way patents encourage the spread of ideas is through supporting of freedom to 
operate.159 While it often seems that there are only two approaches for supporting innovation 
                                                          
150 See Boston Consulting Grp., supra note __, at 5-6. 
151 Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don't Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition 
Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804 (2004). 
152 Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research and Industrial Innovation: An Update of Empirical Findings. 26 RES. 
POL’Y 773, Table 1 (1998). 
153 Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, Characteristics, and 
Financing, 77 Review of Econ. and Stat. 55, 55. (1995). 
154 For an overview of the Bayh-Dole Act, see e.g., David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: a Model for Other OECD Governments?, in ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF EDWIN MANSFIELD 233 (2005). 
155The Bayh- Dole Act: It’s Working, AUTM, 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Bayh_Dole_Act&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentI
D=11603 (last visited ___) but see id. (arguing that the Act was neither necessary nor sufficient for stimulating 
university spinoffs). 
156 Id. at __.  
157 Walter D. Valdivia, University Start-Ups: Critical for Improving Technology Transfer, CENTER FOR 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS. WASHINGTON, DC: BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 13 (2013)/ 
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with patents – to opt-in and exclude, or to opt-out and share, intellectual property,160 a widely-
used approach between them is to acquire patents in order to share, or “defensive patenting.”  
Defensive patenting is the practice of acquiring patents in order to trade with or deter 
assertions by others whose patents you may be practicing.161 In complex technology areas where 
advances build upon one another, competitors will often practice each other’s patents. The result 
is a sort of détente, in which each is free to access the technology of the other without having to 
clear the rights first. Defensive patenting gives those who need it the security to share freely 
about their technology, and those who want it, the ability to access and incorporate features that 
are patented by others.162  These freedoms come at a cost, however. The diversion of resources 
to patenting and the transactions costs required to support defensive patent portfolios have been 
called a drag on innovation, and raise the cost of entry for smaller firms without the resources to 
develop large, defensive portfolios.163 
Still, the importance to firms of being able to access others’ technology is reflected in survey 
results about the reasons for patenting previously discussed. (Figure 1) Respondents selected 
among a number of motives for patenting reflecting the pursuit of “freedom to operate”:164 to 
prevent suits,165 negotiate or cross-license,166 and for “pure defense.”167 59% of companies in the 
Cohen study selected the prevention of suits, and 47% chose negotiations as a reason for 
patenting.168 Likewise, Nagaoka and Walsh found “pure defense” to be the third most “highly” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
159 See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License as a New 
Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) 
(providing an overview of various approaches companies have used to preserve freedom to operate). 
160 WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS, ___ (2014). (contrasting the open source, public domain model that 
dominated the Internet and web, with the proprietary model followed by the hardware and semiconductor industries) 
161 Chien, Arms Race, supra note ___, at 321.  
162 See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives To Innovate in Japan and the 
United States, 31 RES. POL’Y 1349, 1361 (2002) (describing the acquisition of patents to secure “player” status, with 
access to rivals’ technology). 
163 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME 1, 125, 127-130 (2001). 
164 See Rassenfosse, supra note ___, at  Table 1.  
165 See Cohen et al., supra note __, at Figures 7-8; see Graham et al., supra note __, at Figure 2; see Rassenfosse, 
supra note __, at Table 1. 
166 See Cohen et al., supra note __, at Figures 7-8; see Graham et al., supra note __, at Figure 2; see Nagaoka & 
Walsh, supra note __, at Figure 13. 
167 See Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note __, at Figure 13. 
168 See Cohen et al, supra note __, at __ Figures 7-8. 
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important reason for patenting,169 after exclusive commercial exploitation and blocking. 51% of 
the respondents to a European Patent Office study agreed with the statement “I patent mainly to 
preserve my freedom of operation,” just 15% less than agreed with the statement “I patent 
mainly to prevent imitation by competitors.”170  
Exactly how many patents are primarily held for reasons of access, rather than exclusion, is 
unknown. But among the top 50 owners of patents,171 many if not most of them can be 
considered “high-tech” companies that depend on freedom of action in order to keep up with the 
rapid pace of competition. Five out of the top ten172 have taken steps to commit some or all of 
their patents to defensive uses, as described below.  
In a quiet revolution, for example, LG Electronics has opened up tens of thousands of patents 
to small and medium-sized companies,173 and Samsung, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine 
Engineering, Hyundai Motor, and Panasonic have taken similar steps.174 Google, whose patent 
portfolio ranks eighth in the world, and Canon, which has the third most patents, have both 
committed to restricting the transfer of any of their patents to entities focused on patent 
litigation.175 IBM, which has been the top filer for patents for years, as well as Sony, Google, LG 
Electronics, Canon, and over 1,300 other companies176 are signatories to the Open Invention 
Network’s (OIN) “non-aggression” pact, which commits them to granting royalty-free patent 
licenses over Linux technology to other signatories.177 OIN’s pact is true to spirit of “copyleft” 
licenses, which share the aim of creating a software commons, and also do so through reciprocity 
– requiring those who benefit from others’ forbearance to also forbear.178 
                                                          
169 See Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note __, at __ Figure 13. 
170 See Rassenfosse, supra note __, at Table 1. 
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 The economic footprint of Linux is economically significant. The Linux kernel serves as the 
basis for Android, which as of 2014 captured 75% of the smartphone market,179 and the Chrome 
web browser, which has 60% of the browser market.180 Linux is used by 53% of websites that 
use UNIX, which in turn powers about 60% of all websites.181 Linux dominates super computer 
operating systems,182 although it lags Microsoft Windows and Apple’s IOS among desktop 
operating systems.183  
E. Patents and Innovation by Diffusion  
The three case studies just described describe ways in which patents further innovation 
through diffusion rather than exclusion. Instead of keeping their ideas and knowhow to 
themselves, firms are strategically sharing them, in order to find partners, or to enable greater 
access to the ideas of others. Patents are an integral part of this exchange, with consequences for 
the social organization of innovation, and the personal autonomy of creative professionals.184 
If MIT can provide its ideas to Lego, and see them flourish, it can continue doing what it’s 
best at– educating and innovating, while Lego can do what is best at – developing, marketing, 
and selling great products. If individual inventors can come up with ideas like biosolvents, and 
partner with companies to bring these ideas to market, they can share in the benefits of seeing a 
successful product come to the market without themselves having to acquire or develop the 
expertise that commercialization requires. Property rights, and the ability to trade them, enable 
creative people to work autonomously, Robert Merges has argued, with greater freedom to work 
on what they want to, with whom they want to, and in the way they want to.185 Robust markets 
for innovation create gains from trade and benefits from specialization, which from the time of 
Adam Smith have been perceived as drivers of modern economic growth. 
                                                          
179 Smartphone OS Market Share, Q4 2014, IDC, http://www.idc.com/prodserv/smartphone-os-market-share.jsp 
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The result is a more participatory, inclusive innovation ecosystem that does not 
discriminate on the basis on where an idea is born, but enables the best ideas to find their way to 
the market through any of variety of pathways. The next section builds upon these examples to 
articulate a diffusion-focused framework for viewing the patent system. 
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Part III: Towards a Diffusion Framework for the Patent System 
In this part I articulate a novel diffusion framework for viewing the patent system. 
Traditionally, patents are thought to impact the diffusion of technology in two ways. Patents 
induce the disclosure of technical secrets and information that the public can learn from and be 
inspired by.186 But increased protection also means less competition, higher prices, 
and slower diffusion during the patent’s term.187 According to this pattern of exclusion, followed 
by diffusion, patents mediate the tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency.188 Patents 
encourage initial investments to be undertaken, supporting dynamic efficiency. Post-expiration, 
the patent system facilitates the widest possible dissemination of the inventor’s knowledge, 
furthering static efficiency.189    
But as the examples in Part II show, technical knowledge need not be spread only 
through patent documents, nor must permission to practice inventions be relegated to the post-
patent period. Open innovation and markets for technology enable inventors to transfer their 
technology and ideas to other settings, on exclusive and non-exclusive bases. Defensive 
patenting strategies allow firms to more freely access each other’s technologies before a patent 
expires.  
 Nor must innovation by diffusion be at odds with innovation by exclusion. Indeed, a 
careful reading of the history of patent law shows that just as exclusion has always been the 
means, the diffusion of innovation has always been the desired end. The purpose of the first 
patent law was to attract artisans and printers from other territories to Venice.190 The early 
novelty requirement had a distinctly nationalistic flavor– a patent would be justified only if the 
skill was new to the country,191 and British patents, which were just one sort of privilege that 
                                                          
186 See, e.g. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) (describing the role of patent 
disclosures in stimulating innovation during and after the patent term). 
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was routinely granted throughout Western Europe,192 extended only to actually produced 
“manufactures.”193  A number of studies have documented the positive link between intellectual 
property and the geographical diffusion of technology,194 though, broader or faster diffusion does 
not necessarily lead to greater social welfare if that diffusion is achieved at a higher than 
necessary social cost.195 And although US patent law does not currently require practice of the 
patent, it continues to reward it in several ways.196  
The status quo creates space for an alternative lens through which to view the patent system, 
based on the ability to simultaneously promote innovation by diffusion and exclusion. I begin by 
describing a framework for patent diffusion, and then apply this framework to three mechanisms 
of patent diffusion: disclosure, transfer, and the pursuit of freedom to operate. 
A. A Framework for Patent Diffusion 
                                                          
192 See Machlup, supra note__, at 2-3. 
193 Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1297–8 (2012) (describing the English Statute 
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1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Details from practice make this requirement easier to satisfy. Remedies are 
also more readily available when the patentee practices the invention. In order to get the legal remedy of lost profits, 
the patentee must demonstrate foreseeable loss. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) Lost sales due to the infringement can suffice, but are only available if the patentee is selling the product; 
damages are otherwise limited to a reasonable royalty. 35 USC 284. In the past years, requests for injunctions by 
non-practicing entities have been routinely denied, not granted. Chien & Lemley, supra note ___ at Figure 1 
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Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 862-3 (2003) and has the right to 
“march-in” and compel the licensing of federally-funded patents in certain cases.196 35 U.S.C. § 203(1).  
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As discussed, diffusion is the spread of ideas and knowledge from one setting to other 
settings through specific channels over time.197 In this section, I describe a framework of patent 
diffusion based on the multiple channels by which knowledge of patented or patentable 
inventions and the permission to use that knowledge is spread from one setting to another. (Table 
2)  
Table 2: A Framework for Patent Diffusion   
Mechanism of 
Diffusion  
Channel of 
Diffusion 
Specifics/Examples 
Disclosure  
 
Patents and 
Related 
Disclosures 
Utility patents, practice of the patent 
Patent 
Applications  
Utility and provisional patent applications 
Defensive 
Publication 
Disclosures intended to preempt patenting of 
the invention and put the invention in the public 
domain 
Transfer 
 
 
Technology 
Licenses and 
Agreements 
Technology transfer, exclusive or non-exclusive 
technology licensing, patent standards 
Sharing 
 
Defensive 
Patent 
Strategies 
Holding patents to provide access to technology 
and freedom from suit/patent trading 
Patent Waivers/ 
Pledges 
Tesla’s patent pledge, OIN patent non-assertion 
promise, and others to forbear, humanitarian or 
related waivers, expiration of patents 
The patent system can encourage the spread of technical information and permissions, not 
only through patents themselves, but through, for example, patent applications, patent practice, 
defensive publications, and technology licenses. Each of these channels of diffusion can be 
associated with one of three patent-related mechanisms for spreading technical knowledge and 
the permission to use it from one setting to another: 
• Disclosure encompasses the diffusion of information about patented or patentable 
inventions from the inventor to the world. The diffusion of this knowledge can take place 
through patent documents and products, without the permission to practice the invention 
until the patent is out of force. However, the patent system also encourages disclosures in 
                                                          
197 See Everett, supra note ___, at 5.  
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the form of patent applications and defensive publications. When they succeed, defensive 
publications put the invention into the public domain, enabling all to use them. 
 
• Technology Transactions convey information about and permission to practice the 
invention, from the patentee to one or more commercializers of the technology. This 
diffusion can take place, e.g. through exclusive technology licenses that transfer 
technology from one setting to another, or non-exclusive patent licenses that provide 
rights to multiple technology implementers. The patent rights are often just one 
component of the transfer, which may also include know-how, personnel, and related 
resources needed to implement the technology.  
 
• Acts that facilitate sharing of patented or patentable technologies enable the freer spread 
of information and permissions within the innovation ecosystem. These whitespace 
creating acts can take place before or during the term of a patent, and can be initiated by 
innovators who seek freedom to operate or patentees who want to share their inventions 
with others. Before a patent is issued, defensive publication can be used to put 
technologies into the public domain. During the term of a patent, permission to practice 
can be provided by the patentee through mechanisms like selective patent waiver or 
promises to forbear, and extended through practices like defensive patenting. The 
patentee may also put the invention in the public domain through patent non-renewal.  
 
Embracing diffusion does not require rejecting exclusion. In fact, in each of the primary 
mechanisms of patent diffusion, the right to exclude plays an important role. For example, to the 
extent that patent exclusivities motivate the disclosure of useful information,198 they are needed 
to have something to diffuse in the first place. In the case of technology transfer from a patentee 
to a commercializer of the patentee’s technology, the patentee’s rights to exclude can be vital to 
her willingness to engage in discussions with a potential partner,199 who may in turn only be 
interested in an exclusive license. And defensive patenting to enable freedom to operate depends 
critically on the patentee’s ability to retaliate if attacked. Certainly, diffusionary and exclusionary 
priorities can be at odds, for example, when patentees forbear from patenting due to the secrets 
they must reveal.200 But in many cases, the exclusive right against the world that patents confer 
is more than what a patentee needs or wants.  
Focusing on patent diffusion does require the patent system to change its orientation, 
however, and to reconsider levers that have largely been overlooked by patent scholars and 
policymakers. For example, the patent system’s current bias towards exclusion has arguably 
                                                          
198 The relatively low importance of patents as sources of technical knowledge is discussed infra, at Part III.B. 
199 See infra, at Part III.C.1. (describing the role of patents in overcoming Arrow’s information paradox). 
200 See infra, at fn. ___.  
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installed certain defaults, to “closed” rather than “open,” that a new focus on diffusion would 
revisit. In addition, the patent system does not make it easy for patentees to choose a “diffusion” 
or “pure defense” 201 option. In addition, those who want to purposefully put their technologies in 
the public domain have no guarantee of being able to do so. A diffusion focus would change that.  
In the following sections, I draw upon three disparate strands of patent theory, and extend 
them by applying the diffusion framework described above to reveal largely neglected levers of 
patent diffusion.  
B. Diffusion by Disclosure 
“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude,’”202 
the Supreme Court has said. The patent document must disclose the invention, “in sufficient 
detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention,”203 and “stimulate ideas and the 
eventual development of further significant advances in the art.”204 This view makes patent 
documents the primary instrument of patent disclosure, and indeed, the measure of whether 
exclusive rights are warranted.  
A focus on diffusion requires looking beyond the four corners of a patent. The patent system 
induces disclosure, not only in the patent, but also through practice and defensive publications. 
The terms on which this storehouse of information can be accessed also matter. The mere 
production of knowledge does not guarantee that others will be able to exploit it.205 In this 
section, I extend disclosure theory to consider both “content” and “access” levers that can boost 
the diffusion of technical information to society through the patent system.  
1. Disclosure Theory – Diffusion by Patent Document 
                                                          
201 See Fig. 1, Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note___ at Table 13. (indicating that 45% of US inventor survey 
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To mature into a patent, each patent application must contain a description of the invention, 
how it can be made and used, and the best way of practicing the invention, and demonstrate 
possession by the applicant.206 The main question has been whether or not the “additions to the 
general store of knowledge” patents provide in accordance with these legal requirements, are in 
fact worth the “high price of...exclusive use” as the Supreme Court has claimed.207 Critics argue 
that they often do not.208 First, patents today are badly written, because they serve both legal and 
technical aims209 in the hybrid language of “patentese.”210 Second, firms have incentives to omit 
important technical details, and may provide legally insufficient disclosure. 211 Third, the 
disclosed secrets are not real secrets, but are already revealed in the case of self-disclosing 
inventions, ending up in the gratuitous grant of a patent.212 Patents can actually retard disclosure 
as well, by preventing the publication of ideas that a researcher might later want to patent.213 
The available survey evidence appears to reinforce a dim view of patents as sources of 
information. For example, in a survey of 650 publicly-traded firms, patents placed sixth out of 
seven types of disclosures.214 When asked, small and medium enterprises in the UK ranked 
patents eighth out of nine sources,215 behind customers, suppliers, competitors, and other 
information sources.216 In a survey of R&D labs, patents also rated as less important than 
                                                          
206 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring patents to satisfy the enablement, written description, definiteness, and best mode 
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the inventions that the patents cover.”). 
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publications and informal exchanges.217 As the opportunities for exchange grow exponentially, 
through communication platforms such as social media and the Internet, and search technologies 
makes it easier to find relevant information, patents may fall even further behind. 
But even if patents aren’t the most important sources, that does not mean that they do not 
have value. This point is underscored in a forthcoming study. Inventors were asked to quantify 
the time saved in their respective invention processes when patent information was and was not 
available.218 The responses showed considerable differences across industry. Though the median 
value of the time savings was 5.9 hours and the mean, 12.2 hours, in the field of organic 
chemicals, on average, readers of patents saved 36 hours of time. In contrast, digital 
communication technology patents only saved their readers 1.0 hour, on average. That patents 
are likely to disclose more useful details in certain industries than others is reflected in concerns 
about patenting that have been expressed in other contexts. For example, 59% of biotechnology 
startups responding to a survey stated that their last decision not to patent was motivated by their 
desire not to disclose the invention.219 Only 25% of software startups shared this concern.220 
Even if the invention is disclosed elsewhere, patents often contain details that aren’t otherwise 
available.221 
Thus, the answer to the question, do patents provide technical teaching seems to be, 
sometimes, but generally less than other sources of information. But there are a number of other 
disclosures, besides patents, that the patent system can encourage. 
2. Diffusion by Patent Application  
Although studies generally do not do so, it is important to distinguish patent applications 
from patents as sources of technical information. This is underscored by the relatively lower 
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patent grant rate in other countries. For example, only 56% of Japanese applications turn into 
patents, versus a rate of 87% in the US.222 This means that about 44% of applications to the 
Japanese Patent Office will stay in the public domain where others may imitate them. Patent 
applications teach the public in the same way that patents do, but the world is not prevented from 
practicing the invention if the application never becomes a patent. This may explain, in part, the 
number one ranking that Japanese innovators give to patent disclosures, as compared to other 
sources of information.223  In the same survey, US firms ranked patents only third, behind 
publications and informal exchanges. 85% of Japanese firms indicated that patents were 
moderately or very important sources of information, while 49% of US firms did.224  
Despite the USPTO’s high patent grant rate, large numbers of US patent applications do not 
mature into patents. “Provisional” patent applications are informal documents that describe the 
invention. Although they do not become patent applications until a “formal” application is filed, 
applicants have incentives to include full, enabling descriptions in their provisional 
submissions.225 According to current law, provisional patent applications are not published by 
the Patent Office.226 But filers of provisional applications may want to disclose them, at least for 
the reason that this will decrease the chances that others will secure patents over the same 
inventions. This calls into question the patent system’s policy of the nonpublication of 
provisionals.  
3. Diffusion by Defensive Publication 
Another overlooked way in which the patent system encourages technical disclosure is 
through its ability to provide freedom to operate in return for the disclosure of an idea through 
“defensive publication.” Because only new and nonobvious inventions can get patents, creating a 
public disclosure that describes an invention, yet is not accompanied by a patent application, 
creates “prior art” against subsequent applications and therefore thwarts the ability of others to 
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later claim the invention.227 This means that the discloser, and the rest of the world, will not be 
precluded from practice by a later-issued patent. The disclosure avoids the cost of patenting, but 
secures freedom of action. It also increases the quality of patents that do issue, as it raises the bar 
by which new applications will be evaluated.228 From a diffusion perspective, this represents, 
perhaps, the best of both worlds – society gets the content of the disclosure but, also, the 
permission to practice it.  
Innovators use a number of outlets to defensively publish. Companies like IBM and 
Xerox have historically published and distributed their own technical journals, detailing 
developments in their research to patent offices.229 There are also “known” outlets for defensive 
publication including the website IP.com, which bills itself as “the world’s first and largest 
online prior art disclosure service,”230 and Research Disclosure, a defensive publishing journal 
that has been around since the 1960s.231 These are disclosures that happen because of the patent 
system. However, while defensive publications are reportedly used widely in places like 
Germany,232 and have been used successfully in several US biotechnology contexts,233 they are 
not generally seen as strategic tools by United States intellectual property owners. Only 2% of 
intellectual property owners strongly agreed, and 26% agreed, with the statement, “[d]efensive 
publication is an important strategic tool for my company,” while 55% of respondents disagreed 
and 14% of respondents strongly disagreed.234 Given defensive publication’s significant 
advantages for diffusion, it is worth considering why this is the case and whether or not changes 
are warranted.  
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4. Access Levers in the Disclosure of Patent Information  
Another dimension of patent diffusion concerns the terms of access to patent texts. Though 
they have received scant attention, access levers in the disclosure of patent texts, including 
timing, search costs, and legal penalties, can accelerate (or retard) the spread of the ideas 
described in patents. For example, patent applications are typically published 18 months after 
they are filed. However, unlike in most of the rest of the world, US applicants can keep their 
patent applications secret, for their entire pendency.235 This is based on the assumption that 
patentees want to keep their secrets for as long as possible. If the application does become a 
patent, as most US applications do, it will be released to the world, if it has not already been 
published. However, that typically will be years after the application date.236 
The timing of patent publications matters and impacts the diffusion of patented information. 
A recent study compared biomedical patent inventions published 18 months after the patent 
application with inventions that were not disclosed until the patent issued. Inventions that were 
published earlier were licensed, on average, 8.5 months earlier. The shorter licensing cycle was 
attributed to the earlier clarification of the inventor’s rights.237 
Another variable that impacts access to patented information is the ability to sift through 
large quantities of patents and find the relevant ones. Numerous commentators have lamented the 
high costs of searching for relevant patents in fields of cumulative information.238 But there is no 
easy way to tell who owns what patents,239 which patents are being practiced, or to discern other 
indicia of relevance.  
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Finally, as discussed earlier, the legal doctrine of willfulness creates strong disincentives for 
inventors to read patents.”240 This structural problem to enabling effective diffusion of patented 
knowledge has been widely recognized.241 In addition, while no penalty accompanies the reading 
and practice of patents that have entered the public domain, it is very difficult to tell whether or 
not a patent has done so, or is still in force.242   
In sum, applying a diffusion framework to the issue of patent disclosure reveals a number of 
largely ignored levers for influencing the content, timing, and uptake of disclosures encouraged 
by the patent system. These include pre-grant publication of patents applications (including 
provisionals), the willfulness doctrine, and the effectiveness of defensive publication. These 
levers are explored in Section IV. 
C. Diffusion by Transfer 
Another justification for the patent system is that it facilitates the diffusion of technology 
from one setting to another through technology licensing. With some notable exceptions,243 
“commercialization” justifications for the patent system have received less attention than the 
classic, reward for invention and disclosure, rationale for the patent system. But the changing 
nature of innovation justifies paying more attention to the ways in which the patent system 
supports technology transactions.  
1. Commercialization Theory – Diffusion Through Trust 
According to commercialization theory, patents make transacting easier in several ways. 
First, they increase trust between patent owners and potential partners, providing a solution to 
Arrow’s information paradox. This is the idea that in the absence of legal protection, an owner 
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cannot sell information to someone who can make better use of it, because in the process of 
selling the information, he will have to disclose it, and the buyer won’t need to pay for it 
anymore.244 Patents, according to the theory, give inventors the security they need to engage in 
discussions with potential partners, with less risk that their ideas will be appropriated.245 Trade 
secrets are practically harder to transact in, because disclosing a secret destroys it.246 Patents are 
also theorized to encourage transactions by helping prevent duplicative investments. Once an 
inventor has a patent, in certain scenarios, she has an incentive to seek out and license the 
technology to others.247 Patents can play a coordination role, drawing together complementary 
users.248 
Yet, reality is more complicated. For technology to actually be transferred from one setting to 
another through a technology license requires a number of steps. One study, of Canadian and US 
technologies, traced the pipeline. It found that, out of 100 licensable technologies, a potential 
licensee was found in 25 cases, negotiations were started in 6 to 7, and licensing deals were 
eventually concluded in 3-4.249 Not only must the parties trust and be willing to talk to each 
other, but they first need to find each other, and then go through a series of other steps, including 
agreeing on scope, price, and term, before a deal can be signed. Corporate patentholders are 
willing to license 70% more patents than are currently licensed;250 the number is likely even 
higher among university patentholders. 
There is room for reducing duplicative research. The European Union estimates that $20 
billion is spent every year to develop innovations and technologies that have already been 
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built.251 But to prevent this duplication, the parties need to be aware of each other and willing to 
transact, and they must agree on the terms of transfer. 
To address undercommercialization, some have proposed more and stronger patent rights.252 
But stronger patents rights, by themselves, will not make it more likely that parties will find each 
other, or agree to transact. In fact, stronger rights can have the opposite effect, when they cause 
rights holders to overvalue their technology. In transactions with universities, for example, 
companies often complain that universities aggressively patent, overvalue their intellectual 
assets, and issue unreasonable licensing terms.253  
A diffusion lens for viewing the patent system picks up where commercialization theory 
leaves off. Rather than focusing only on trust and the theoretical ability to reduce duplicative 
research, a diffusion framework also takes into account existing barriers to technology-diffusing 
transactions. 
2. Diffusion Through the Reduction of Search and Transaction Costs  
Why aren’t technology transactions happening more readily? Those who have studied this 
question have identified a number of reasons. A persistent problem across both commercial and 
academic partnership settings is inherent uncertainty about the value of the technology.254 Patent 
values are so skewed that they have been analogized to lottery tickets.255 In the university 
technology transfer context, for example, the 2007 revenue leader was New York University, 
which had made more than $794 million, the vast majority from one pharmaceutical license for 
one single commercially successful drug.256 Only 0.5% of license agreements actually generate 
more than $1 million in royalty income, and from 1983 to 2013, 87% of technology transfer 
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offices did not break even.257 Uncertainty about the freedom to operate can play a role,258 as can 
certainty about patent right also matters. This is because, prior to the issuance of the patent, the 
parties have asymmetric information about the likelihood of its grant. The buyer may want a 
discount to account for the risk that a patent will not issue, or issue with adequate scope.259  
Culture and lack of experience with licensing are also barriers to technology transactions. 
Large firms are less willing to license than small firms, and are also less willing to license when 
they themselves are practicing an invention.260 But they also likely have the greatest stock of 
uncommercialized patents.  
But in addition to these variables, many of which are beyond the scope of this discussion, 
some of the most frequently cited obstacles to licensing include the search costs in finding a 
technology partner, and friction in the licensing transaction. There is no “universal marketplace” 
for technology in which patentees can signal their willingness to license their technology or 
patents and potential buyers can express their desire to purchase technology or patents.261 
Deal friction is also a problem. Within commercial contexts, Arora and Gambardella cite fear 
of a “winner’s curse” because technology sellers can negotiate with a number of potential 
technology buyers at the same time, leading the winner to overpay. While this dynamic is not 
necessarily limited to technology transactions, because of the unique nature of intangible goods 
and the lack of an agreed-upon approach to technology valuation, the parties lack a common 
price anchor, and therefore may be separated by an unbridgeable distance in negotiations.262 
Technology agreements in university settings have similar, and distinct, issues. The 
asymmetries between technology buyer and seller are compounded by the fact that the party 
negotiating on behalf of the university seller is the technology transfer office (TTO), rather than 
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the university inventor with subject matter expertise.263 University negotiations are known to be 
accompanied by friction and delays, with the parties having a hard time agreeing on terms.264 
When the buyer is an investor in a university spinoff, not only must the university trust that the 
investor won’t steal its idea, but the investor must also trust that the spinoff to perform. This 
creates what Cooter and Scahefer call a “double trust dilemma” 265 that is challenging because 
“the investor distrusts the innovator with her money, and the innovator distrusts the investor with 
his ideas.”266 The National Academy of Sciences has recommended that universities seeking to 
encourage entrepreneurship should consider instituting more standardized terms for licensing 
university-generated technology,267 with several universities following suit.268  
To make a deal, the parties must want to sell or buy technology, to be able to locate relevant 
opportunities, to be willing to talk to each other, and to agree to the terms of the deal. Companies 
need to be willing to come to the table in the absence of an impending lawsuit. In Part IV, I 
consider ways that the patent system may be able to reduce some of the information and search 
costs that accompany each of these transactions. 
 
D.  Diffusion Through Sharing 
A final way that technological knowledge is spread is by sharing it. By affirmatively giving 
up rights to exclude, patent owners spread permissions to access and use technical knowledge. 
Freedom to operate motivates 45-60% of companies to patent. (Figure 1) But for patents to serve 
this purpose, they must be shared with, rather than held back from others. The more that others 
practice one’s patents, the freer one is to practice the patents of others.  
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Sharing may be done for humanitarian reasons as well. With patent licenses it has secured 
from the NIH, Roche, Bristol Meyers Squibb, Abbvie and others, the Medicines Patent Pool has 
expanded access to HIV medicines in over a hundred developing and emerging countries, where 
the majority of people with HIV live.269 Sharing can serve any of a variety of corporate or 
personal interests. 
Scholars have tended to look at particular vehicles of patent sharing in isolation.270 But a 
diffusion lens looks more broadly at the potential gains and costs of more formally supporting 
sharing. That is because, although acts of sharing generally confer private benefits to patentees, 
they have social benefits as well, through greater diffusion and freedom of action, and the two 
aren’t always aligned.271 A company may receive positive press from promising that it will share 
its technology with others, but society does not get its benefit if this promise isn’t kept. There 
may be social gains then, to formalizing such commitments, as long as it does not deter initial 
commitment-making. 
The next subsection considers the various ways in which companies have tried to share their 
patents. The strong desire and even need to share patents, in complex, interdependent 
technologies, combined with the lack of easy ways to do so, present opportunities to enhance the 
patent system’s diffusive role. 
1. Diffusion through Inclusion – Property Theory 
How to square the exclusive rights of property with the inclusive desires of property owners 
has, over time, captured the attention of property scholars. The right to exclude does not obligate, 
but allows property owners to exclude,272 leading to descriptions of property owners as 
gatekeepers, who can exclude, or include others based on the circumstances.273 Under Coasian 
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conceptions of property, well-defined property rights are start, not end, points in the allocation of 
rights and relations between firms and people.274  
In advancing the idea of a “right to include” alongside the “right to exclude” Kelley has 
cataloged the various ways in which property owners can include others, and their costs and 
benefits.275 Informal mechanisms like nonenforcement and waivers have the benefit of relative 
ease of administration and low transactions costs – no other party needs to be consulted or 
negotiated with. They also have flexibility, property owners can specify themselves the range of 
rights that they are giving up, and reveal their intentions according to their own timing.276 But 
this also makes such mechanisms less reliable and certain. Contracts between one or more parties 
giving up rights provide more certainty, but are costly to administer and vulnerable to defects in 
formation.277 Because they commit only those who enter into them, rather than the properties 
that they impact, contracts can also be, like informal mechanisms, vulnerable to changes in 
ownership and other future events,278 and leave the rights of third party beneficiaries 
uncertain.279 Recognized restrictions on property, including covenants, leases, and servitudes, 
may confer rights to enter and use someone else’s land without interference from the property 
owner.  
Each of these mechanisms has been used to share patents – the largest number through non-
enforcement, but also, increasingly, through waiver and contract mechanisms. Each has its 
advantages and drawbacks, as described below. 
2. Diffusion through Nonenforcement  
Most patents are not enforced.280 Unlike other means of sharing, nonenforcement is passive, 
and ex post, effected through the failure of a patentee to bring a suit, once infringement has 
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occurred. In many cases, nonenforcement is also not deliberate, but an artifact of the low 
commercialization rate of patents and the high cost of enforcement versus uncertain and/or low 
damages.  
However, some nonenforcement is deliberate. As described earlier, the largest portfolios of 
patents are held by companies that rely crucially on freedom of action.281 Sharing is facilitated 
by the mutually assured destruction that would result if parties exercised the overlapping rights 
they had in court. Nonenforcement is so pervasive that it has been suggested that the large 
proliferation of patents, and their potential harm to innovation has effectively become a 
“nonproblem.”282 
However, in a number of cases patents that companies acquired for the sake of defensive 
purposes have “turned offensive.” Triggers include changes to the patentee’s business model, or 
the transfer of the patents to patent “trolls” that face lower costs and constraints on assertion.283 
These transfers bring into focus the largest drawback to nonenforcement as a tool of sharing – its 
lack of durability. There is no reason, once a patent has changed hands, to expect that 
nonenforcement will continue.  
3. Diffusion through Waiver  
A more proactive way of promoting sharing is through affirmative waiver.284 The number of 
public commitments to waive patent rights has proliferated in recent years, leading a nonprofit 
entity to memorialize such pledges in a single, online database.285 This counteracts two 
limitations of waivers: their impermanence, and the costs of searching for them, given the 
multiple forms that they can take.286 Cisco and Yahoo have used blog posts287 and Congressional 
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testimony,288 respectively, to announce promises not to sell patents to trolls. AirBnB, Dropbox, 
and other companies have signed on to YCombinator founder Paul Graham’s “Patent Pledge,” 
which commits each firm listed on a website to refrain from enforcing software patents against 
companies with less than 25 employees.289  
Patent holders have used waivers to drive technology adoption.290 For example, 
commitments made in the context of technical standards, protocols that provide a common 
design for a product or process,291 are meant to clear the way for uptake of the standard. The 
WCDMA standard, which covers 3G mobile telecommunications, for example, is covered by an 
estimated 1,000 patent families.292 A commitment to make these patents available on “fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms reassures standards adopters that they 
won’t be subject to surprise attacks after adoption.293 Standards-setting organizations (SSOs) 
commonly include these commitments in their bylaws, which patentholders agree to comply with 
when they submit membership applications in exchange for participating during the standards 
process.294 
Promises not to enforce patents have also been used to respond to public concerns. Following 
scrutiny of a broad patent Southern California Edison held on communications between utility 
companies and their customers, the company released it to the public.295 Myriad Genetics, a 
company whose practices led the American Civil Liberties Union to file a suit to invalidate its 
highly controversial DNA patents, pledged to give free access to the patents to academic 
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researchers. This allowed the company to bolster the claim that it was not an aggressive enforcer 
of patents.296 
But while relatively easy to make, promises are hard to enforce under the law, except under 
certain circumstances. Those who have made representations to standards bodies have been 
criticized for deviating from their public commitments.297 Under the theory of promissory 
estoppel, though, only promises that lead to reasonable reliance are actionable against the 
promisor.298 Showing reliance would be challenging in the case of pledges to “not sell patents to 
trolls” – what action can a company reasonably point to taking as a result of just this specific 
promise? But even in cases where a company adopts a patented technology, and can prove that 
the patentee’s promise not to sue factored into the decision, showing that the company otherwise 
would not have adopted the technology can be hard. In addition, in some cases the promisee is 
not the implementer, but a third-party organization, for example, that sets up the standard. But 
third-party promissory estoppel claims are generally harder to prove. Patent promises are often 
vague, failing to identify the patents that they cover.299 Whether a court would find that a 
promise that doesn’t specify the scope of its own rights is reasonable to rely upon is difficult to 
predict. Finally, if the patent changes hands, enforcement becomes far more challenging because 
promissory estoppel binds the promisor, but not the promisor’s successors in interest.300 
4. Diffusion through Contract 
Contract would seem to address some of limitations of waivers and nonenforcement. 
Some companies have memorialized their promises to share patents through formal contracts 
with their employees301 and other companies,302 for example. These deals yield reciprocal 
                                                          
296 Id. 
297 See, e.g., Merges & Kuhn, supra note ____, at 1. (describing the use of “bait-and-switch” and “snake-in-the-
grass” tactics by patentholders). 
298 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90. (“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be 
limited as justice requires.”). 
299 Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note __, at Table 2. 
300 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or is Promissory Estoppel Really as 
Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 546 (2002). 
301 Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement April 17, 2012, available at 
https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patent-agreement (last visited March 20, 2015) 
302 See OIN non-aggression pact, described supra at II.D. 
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benefits, or consideration, and access to contract remedies. Yet they entail coordination and 
formation costs, sometimes extensive, raise antitrust concerns, and are vulnerable to some of the 
same problems that apply to waivers.  
For example, the Inventor Protection Agreement (IPA) that Twitter uses promises its 
employees that it will only use their patents for “defensive purposes,”303 a commitment that has 
been used to attract talent and build culture at the firm.304 But while innovators outside the 
company are the main beneficiaries of the agreement, they are mere third-parties to the contract, 
leaving them on shaky legal ground.305  
Patent pools, in which companies get together to offer patents over a technology, 
illustrate some of the issues that can beset patent contracts. Though they have been around since 
the mid-1800s, pools were disfavored by antitrust regulators in the 1940’s and 50’s,306 regaining 
popularity only in 1995 when the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
began issuing guidelines to support pools.307 But while pro-competitive, patent pools can also 
entail significant formation costs. Setting up a patent pool requires figuring out which patents 
belong in the pool.308 The parties need to agree on royalties. To capture the greatest efficiency 
gains, the pool must attract key patentholders, but often the included patents represent a small 
fraction of the relevant patents.309 And patent pools are subject to antitrust scrutiny because 
restrictive licensing terms can raise competitive concerns.310  
This Part has articulated and applied a diffusion lens to the patent system. Promisingly, it has 
uncovered a largely overlooked set of levers that the patent system has for promoting the 
                                                          
303 Benjamin Lee, Brewing our First IPA Patents, and New Adopters, TWITTER BLOG (May 21, 2013) 
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diffusion of technical knowledge and the rights to practice this knowledge. But not surprisingly, 
many of these levers are currently set to default to exclusion. The changing nature of innovation 
make it timely to reconsider these policies. 
Part IV: Diffusionary Patent Levers  
In this Part, I explore some ideas for how our patent system could be made more supportive 
of innovation by diffusion. In some cases, I borrow from suggestions others have advanced while 
in others, the suggestions below are starting rather than end points for further discussion. 
However, there are some potential concerns to address at the outset. 
First, it is important that new options for diffusion represent true options, rather than hard-
coded presets, at least to start. For certain inventions, the current patent system strikes just the 
right balance between exclusion and diffusion. Giving innovators more options to diffuse their 
technologies should not been as an attempt to disrupt the balance where it is working. But by 
giving inventors options and incentives to select, for example, earlier publication, or defensive 
patenting, the options here can further both private and public interests in the diffusion of 
technology and permissions, when they are aligned.  
Second, some may question why the patent system should be responsible for ensuring that 
innovators can diffuse technology to rivals and others , when its Constitutional mandate, after all, 
is to promote the progress by securing “exclusive right(s).” This is a fair question, with several 
responses. First, securing exclusive rights to inventors arguably requires giving control of these 
rights to inventors, to loosen or tighten at their discretion. Providing inventors with more options 
to share their inventions and the practice them with others even during the term of the patent is 
tantamount to giving them finer-grained controls over their rights to exclude. Second, a diffusion 
lens largely enhances, rather than displaces, existing rationales for the patent system. 
Diffusionary levers can be used to further the disclosure function of the patent system. When the 
patent system makes it easier to transfer technology, it serves existing commercialization aims. 
And when inventors can use their patent rights to access the technology of others, that also 
promotes the progress. 
Institutional choice questions are also relevant. It’s important to consider what Congress, the 
courts, the USPTO, the Department of Justice, and other government institutions of the patent 
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system,311 can and should do, within their mandates, to promote innovation by diffusion, and 
what should be left to the non-governmental sector. For example, the nonprofit Creative 
Commons offers a number of licenses that reduce the costs of sharing copyrightable content,312 
potentially offering a greater range of choices than a Congressionally sanctioned option.  
Finally, all of the policy levers described below could be implemented in many ways.  The 
USPTO has a history, for example, of encouraging, through fee discounts or other favorable 
treatment in examination, certain applicant behavior.313 The specific design of any intervention is 
crucial to its successful implementation, but is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
implementation options presented would all need further fleshing out and vetting. With these 
provisos in mind, below I describe a few diffusionary levers of the patent system for potential 
readjustment. 
A. Diffusion by Disclosure 
Some patent disclosures contain useful information but there are currently a number of 
barriers to diffusing this information, on the earliest schedule possible. Removing these could 
enhance the disclosure function of the patent system.  
1. Default to Early Publication  
US patentholders can keep their US-filed patent applications secret during the entire 
pendency of the patent life. When Congress was debating what would become the American 
Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), the provision requiring US inventors to publish their 
applications received harsh criticism. A group of 24 Nobel laureates declared that the policy 
would be “very damaging to American small inventors and thereby discourage the flow of new 
inventions that have contributed so much to America's superior performance in the advancement 
                                                          
311 Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the wide range of 
administrative actors with patent equities). 
312 Loren, supra note ___, at 273. 
313 For example, the USPTO offers discounted fees for small entities and micro-entities, to encourage widespread 
participation in the patent system (described, e.g. at New Fees and Micro Entity Status Take Effect March 19, 
USPTO (Feb. 2013) 
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of Science and technology.”314 As a result, American inventors retain the option of electing 
secrecy if they do not file for international protection. Provisional patents are never published, 
also presumably to keep inventors’ secrets.315 
But despite the strong rhetoric, it’s unclear that patentees actually desire secrecy. According 
to a recent study, the majority of inventors with the option of keeping their patent applications 
secret chose not to,316 and even paid to have their secrets revealed.317 Small inventors, who 
critics were particularly concerned about, were actually more willing to have their applications 
published than large inventors.318  
To the extent patent disclosures are useful, earlier disclosure benefits the public, as it leads to 
the earlier dissemination of technology to the world, including through related publications.  But 
it also can benefit patentees, enabling them to stake out their position in a technological area319 
and leading to earlier licensing.320 It also allows the patent application to serve as prior art to and 
limit the applications of others. These benefits, in many cases, may outweigh any costs 
associated with earlier transparency. 
The insight that inventors do not always want to keep their inventions secret, especially in the 
face of advocacy asserting the opposite, has broader implications for patent publication policy. 
Right now, utility patent applications are published with an 18-month delay. 48%321 of an 
estimated 2M provisional patent applications322 are never even released to the public323 because 
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http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/04/priority-provisional-applications.html (last visited ____).  
323 When a patent application claims benefit to a provisional application, the provisional application is accessible 
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they do not mature into patent applications. It is worthwhile to consider changing these defaults. 
While early publication technically exists for utility applications, according to a little known 
provision of the law, 324 explicitly giving patentees the choice could have great social benefits. A 
diffusionary alternative would be to adjust the default for provisionals to be open rather than 
closed, and for utility applications to publication upon filing, rather than after an 18-month delay, 
but with the right of inventors to opt-out of these choices. 
2. Remove Disincentives to Reading Patents  
It is also worth revisiting the current, willfulness disincentive for reading patents.325 The 
criteria of “knowledge of the patent” that it is connected to is arguably both overinclusive and 
underinclusive, with respect to what the patent system is trying to deter. For example, why 
should an innovator who studies and reverse engineers a patentee’s product or website be less 
subject to willfulness than one who happens to read a patentee’s patent, along with many others, 
in the course of doing routine research? At the same time, why should an innovator be punished 
for being comprehensive about checking different sources of technical knowledge, including 
patents, which are free to access unlike many technical journals, if there is no evidence that the 
patentee actually derived anything from the patent? 
One solution, suggested by Lemley and Tangri, would be to substitute the current 
willfulness standard with one that would penalize not knowledge of a patent but adopting a 
technology with knowledge that it was derived from the patentee, from any source.326 Mere 
knowledge of a patent would not raise the likelihood that an infringer be assessed triple damages. 
Rather, there would also need to be some indicia that the patentee took advantage of the 
knowledge within the patent, in order to trigger the penalty.327 Another, administrative solution, 
would be to enable patentees to search among expired and lapsed patents, where no willfulness 
penalty applies. While reading these patents would not subject the reader to enhanced 
willfulness, there is no easy way to access just these patents.328  
3. Remove Barriers to Putting Technology in the Public Domain  
                                                          
324 See 37 C.F.R. 1.219 Early Publication. 
325 As described supra, at I.A.3. 
326 Lemley & Tangri, supra note ___, at 1116. 
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It is worth considering how to remove barriers to innovators putting technology in the 
public domain. Defensive publication offers an important way, but for it to work, it requires the 
USPTO to be aware of the publication and to apply it to block the grant of a related application. 
While this process can be successful, patent examiners tends to rely on patents, not publications, 
for prior art,329 and have limited time to search for new references,330 when they examine 
patents. At times, defensive publications have been considered to fall short of preempting 
because they do not contain sufficient technical disclosures,331 or the PTO process has tended to 
skip over them.332 These realities may be contributing to the low rate of defensive publication in 
the US.333 
Replacing the PTO’s Defensive Publication Program,334 beginning in 2000, the USPTO 
maintained a statutory invention registry containing the specifications of a regularly filed 
application for a patent without examination.335 A statutory invention registration (SIR) was not 
a patent, but because it was filed with the PTO, and was prepared like a patent, it was more likely 
to be seen and applied by examiners.336 However, the SIR program was unpopular, likely due to 
the cost of preparing registrations, and was abandoned in 2011.337  
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Recently, the USPTO has taken a number of executive actions to improve the quality of 
patents by using crowdsourced prior art.338 International patent practices may be instructive to 
consider as it does so. The Patent Cooperation Treaty requires “mandatory search” of certain 
patents databases that the public can submit prior art to.339 This provides greater reassurance that 
submitted documents will actually be reviewed. The European Patent Office (EPO) has also 
worked to integrate technical databases of practice with patent search databases.340 The USPTO 
has been urged to do the same.341 But to ensure a thorough search, it would also need to give 
examiners adequate time to search non-patent references. 
 
4. Remove the Marking Requirement’s Penalty for Practice  
As described earlier, patent law has long rewarded the practice of patents.342 Descriptions of 
the early US patent system circumscribed the subject of a patent as “something that has been 
reduced to practice; it is not enough that it is merely practicable or possible.”343 But there are 
other ways in which patent law has come to penalize the practice, rather than non-practice, of 
patents. The “marking doctrine” in patent law requires those who practice their inventions to put 
the world on notice by marking products or their packaging in order to recover damages during 
the full period of infringement.344 The purpose of the marking requirement is to prevent innocent 
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infringement and encourage patentees to give notice of the existence of their patents.345 
However, according to case law, the requirement does not apply to those who do not practice 
their patented inventions346 or to process patents.347 This interpretation of the law discriminates 
in favor of non-practicing patentees and owners of process patents, who are automatically 
entitled to damages as of the time of infringement.348 Closing these loopholes, as others have 
called for,349 would remove the current biases against practiced and product patents, further 
contributing to enhanced disclosure to the public.   
B. Diffusion by Transfer 
Commentators have identified a number of challenges in current markets for technology. 
While few would argue that the government is in the best position to “make markets,” there may 
be ways for the patent system to nevertheless reduce the search and information costs of 
transacting in technology that have been identified as obstacles to technology transfers.  
One of the USPTO’s two enumerated duties, for example, is to “be responsible for 
disseminating to the public information with respect to patents and trademarks,”350 and the 
USPTO, by virtue of its position within the patent system, is well positioned to collect, and 
disseminate, a number of types of information. It could use this power in a few ways.  
1. Enable Public Recordation of Licensing Offers, without Litigation Impact  
The USPTO could make it easier for potential technology partners to find each other by 
enabling patentees to indicate, and the public to discover, the availability of the technology for 
licensing. This could take place through a program like the licensing feature that the World 
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has offered since 2012.351 Applicants to international 
patents can report licensing information and terms to international patent authorities, to be 
disseminated to the public in order to promote voluntary licensing.352 In November 2013, WIPO 
introduced the WIPO GREEN online marketplace, which enables sellers and buyers to more 
readily find each other, in order to promote the innovation and diffusion of green technologies.353  
One persistent concern with these programs, however, is that if patentees list patents for 
licensing, they may lose the ability to later seek exclusive rights. In the US, courts consider the 
inadequacy of legal damages to decide whether or not to grant injunctions.354 But that can be 
harder to prove if the patentee has an “open licensing” policy. To address this concern, courts 
should recognize that such listings do not mean that patentees are not giving up exclusion, even 
as they also seek diffusion, through transfers.  
Another issue has been the lack of dissemination of information regarding the availability 
of patents for license, once disclosed. US patent owners can technically already provide “notice 
of the availability of an application or a patent for licensing or sale” to the USPTO,355 however, 
this information is not disseminated except through a little-read weekly publication of the PTO, 
the Official Gazette, and not searchable by patent number. A small administrative change, 
enabling licensing offers to be searchable and recorded within the patent record, could greatly 
enhance the discoverability of license information.  
Taking such steps could reduce the costs of ensuring that willing buyers and willing 
sellers can find each other.  
2. Enhance Patent Information Infrastructure & Create Registries of Licensing Data  
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To make a market, accurate, available data is essential. Although the PTO’s statutory 
mandate is to transmit patent information in fulfillment of this mandate,356 the current patent 
information and reporting infrastructure suffers from gaps in the statutory authority, compliance, 
and reporting of patent information that could be filled.  
The most glaring recent omission concerns who owns a patent. Patent ownership is a critical 
determinant of the patent’s likely path, but currently, reporting ownership to the USPTO is 
voluntary.357 Though current law protects against certain types of fraud if such updating 
occurs,358 there is no way to be sure who owns a patent. Although the USPTO, implementing an 
executive action of the White House, recently undertook an initiative to require recordation of 
patent ownership, it ultimately concluded that legislative authority was the best way to impose 
this requirement.359  
Even existing rules requiring the production of patent information are not necessarily 
followed. Trial courts are required by law to let the PTO know when a patent is litigated, and the 
adjudicated outcome.360 The PTO is required, in turn, to include this information in the file of 
each patent.361  However, only about 65% of patent files contain the requisite information.362  
Knowing if a patent has been previously litigated– and the outcome of this litigation– clearly has 
significance for an invention’s dissemination. If the patent’s claims are invalidated as a result of 
the litigation, for example, they essentially enter the public domain, and are no longer the subject 
of the patentee’s exclusive rights. 
Patent information has also been underreported in the context of federally-funded 
inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of federal research funding, such as 
universities, to take title to inventions created using federal funds. While the Act affords 
universities with considerable latitude when exercising their patents rights, it contains a number 
of accountability safeguards to ensure that federally-funded intellectual property is being 
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disseminated appropriately. Specifically, grantees must report any subject invention363 developed 
based on federal funding, and also, periodically report on utilization and efforts at obtaining 
utilization.364  But an analysis of academic biomedical patents found prima facie evidence of 
underdisclosure of even the government interest in patents, 365 with a reporting rate of 60-90% 
among known government-funded patents.366 Utilization data, which could be used to drive 
greater dissemination of federally-funded invention, is even harder to come by.367  
Yet this information is essential to several functions of that directly bear on how the 
invention is disseminated. Without it, it’s difficult for the government determine whether or not 
to compel licensing as it is entitled to in cases where the invention has not achieved practical 
application.368 More generally, the federal government cannot effectively carry out its oversight 
role – as it has been said, if you can’t measure, you can’t manage. Citing a GAO study that found 
patent information to be incomplete and access-restricted, the National Academy of Sciences has 
recommended that federal research agencies reinvigorate data reporting by institutions.369 The 
university community, in turn, has suggested that improving the functionality and usability of 
databases that contain data about federally funded inventions would enhance compliance.370  
Greater information about patent licenses could also be used to facilitate technology 
transfer. The lack of comparable licensing data contributes to the gulf in licensing terms that 
parties to a patent transaction must bridge in order for the license to be formed. But two sets of 
licensing data that are available through governmental processes could help close the gaps: 
licenses that are reported in the process of litigation and, as long as not sealed, become part of 
the public litigation record, and licenses that are formed on the basis of US government-funded 
inventions and are required to be disclosed by law.371 Confidential information could be stripped 
                                                          
363 35 U.S.C. §202 (c)(1).  
364 35 U.S.C. §202 (c)(5). 
365 Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability In Patenting Of Federally Funded Research, 10 Nature 
Biotechnology 953, 954 (2012). 
366 Id., at 955.   
367 Id.   
368 Id.     
369 Merrill & Mazza, supra note ___, at 11. 
370 Higher Ed Response to the White House Innovation Strategy RFI 2014, answer to question 23, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/compiled_rfi_responses_redacted.pdf.  
371 Rai, supra note __, at 953. (describing the Bayh-Dole Act’s requirement for reporting information regarding 
the licensing, assignment and practical utilization of federally-funded patents.) 
59 
 
through a redaction protocol, in a way consistent with President Obama’s Open Data policy.372 
An industry effort to share sanitized licensing data, which is largely currently under NDA, 
conducted in a way consistent with antitrust concerns, could also help to narrow the gap in 
expectations between parties. 
 
C. Diffusion by Freedom to Operate 
A final set of diffusionary levers would make it easier for those who want to give away or 
share their patent rights, and for those who want to rely on these commitments, to do so.  
1. Make it Easier to Waive and Rely on Waivers of Patent Rights 
Currently, there is no easy way for patent holders to give some of their rights to the 
public while reserving others to themselves.  To address each of these defects, Contreras has 
proposed creating a public registry of patent pledges, based on building one himself.373 A public 
registry would reduce the risk of failure to discover that a patent is encumbered with a pledge, 
and the cost of finding pledges, which may otherwise “disappear.”374 A promise that is 
memorialized as an official government record has a better chance of traveling with the patent, 
even if it changes hands or goes through bankruptcy. Multiple commentators have suggested that 
courts embrace expanded reliance theories to obligate patentees to keep their promises,375 but an 
individual defendant has a better chance of prevailing if the promise is actually known to them, 
which they can more easily prove if the promise is recorded.  
I offer two refinements to Contreras’ registration suggestion, which would do much to 
bolster the legitimacy of patent pledges. First, the recorded pledge should be integrated into the 
patent record, at the patent level where possible, or the assignee level, if the pledge is not specific 
enough. Otherwise, the efficiency gains from a centralized repository risk going unrealized. 
Fortunately, the USPTO already has an existing mechanisms for recording encumbrances on 
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specific patent, its I-1595 form, which allows patentees to record security interests that others 
have in the patent.376 This form could be modified to include “waivers.” Second, I suggest that 
members of the public also be allowed to initiate, though not to complete, public recordation of 
waivers. This can help create a record of reliance for the initiator or recordation (or “recorder”) 
and also disincentivize shirking by the patentee who might otherwise publicly promise to waive, 
and receive the public relations benefit of doing so, without actually keeping the promise. 
Though the actual mechanics would need substantial refinement, patentees could receive 
protection from opportunistic or false waiver recordation requests. This could be addressed, for 
example, through the paying of a fine by recorders whose suggestions prove false, to be split 
between the patent office and the patentee, and upfront bonding before the USPTO undertakes 
action to verify the claim and record it. 
Merges has suggested enacting a statutory scheme that would enable items to be sold 
with a “Patent Waived” notice. Like existing statutory marking schemes which reward the 
marking of items with “Patent Pending” or “Patented” notices, such a scheme would create 
rights, but for the public, which would be able to rely on the public domain status of the item.377 
While his idea is promising and would reduce search costs, further proof of the demand for this 
sort of mark is warranted before investing in a new regime.  
2.  An “Open” or “Defensive Only” Option  
One other option for supporting innovation by sharing is to allow those who want waive 
certain rights, for example to give up certain rights, for example, to support “green”, educational 
or noncommercial, uses, or to give up offensive rights and patent defensively only. Although 
many patent “flavors” could be explored, in the following paragraphs, I explore in depth the idea 
of an “open” or “defensive only” patent because the broad use of defensive patenting suggests 
that there is demand for this option.378 While the exact parameters would need to be tested with 
the patentees and refined, a new version of a patent that is “defensive only,” could have limited 
enforceability in general, but full enforceability when the patentee is first attacked. Such an 
election would allow patentholders to signal to the world which patents they are holding not to 
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exclude others, but for defensive reasons, and dramatically reduce the likelihood of litigation by 
limiting the ability of the patentee to later “change their mind,” in the same way that many of the 
patent pledges have tried to.379  
The class of “proprietary inclusion mechanisms,” including easements and servitudes, to 
which a defensive-only patent would belong, is associated with a number of benefits and 
drawbacks. The “defensive-only” status of a patent is likely to be more enforceable than a 
contract or waiver, because it is attached to the property, rather than to the owner. This puts 
third-party beneficiaries on equal footing with others and also, in general, makes the “disarmed” 
status of the patent less vulnerable to changes in ownership.380 The notice costs are also lower 
than for less formal mechanisms, as long as the limitation of rights is publicly recorded. 
Standardization reduces information and bargaining costs,381 and reduces opportunism, for 
example as reflected through clever drafting that reserves more rights even while giving the 
promisee goodwill. Another advantage of sanctioned sharing mechanisms is the availability of 
remedies that go beyond the traditional compensatory damages that are typically available in 
contract law, including specific performance.382  
However, proprietary inclusion mechanisms also have their critics. They are less flexible 
than contracts and waivers, and certainly, a “defensive-only” option would not capture the full 
range and conditions of desires to share patents that exist. In addition, those who promote the 
idea that the number of forms of property should be limited, according to the numerus clausus 
(the “number is closed”) principle point to the burdens on third parties that property forms create. 
The existence of nonstandard property rights increases the cost of transacting in the property 
regimen.383 In addition, creating a new property right could require Congressional authorization, 
an expensive undertaking that may not allow for the continual refinement that would be needed 
to ensure that a new property form would be appropriate and enduring.  
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However, a number of these objections could be addressed by adoption of a “defensive-
only” option for inventors that is reflected, not in a new property form, but the discounting of 
patent fees based on the voluntary waiver of the exclusive rights held by patentees. Though this 
idea is novel, it is not completely unprecedented. In several countries, patentholders can pay 
discounted fees maintenance fees if they voluntarily agree to offer their patents for licensing to 
all comers. Under Germany’s “License of Right” (LOR) scheme, for example, a patent owner 
that declares that anyone can practice the invention in return for reasonable compensation 
receives a 50% discount off their maintenance fees;384 the UK includes a similar scheme.385 The 
German LOR option is elected in about 6% of cases overall, but the rate varies significantly by 
technology area: a 2012 study found that 11% of electrical engineering patents had such 
declarations, but only 1% of biotechnology patents did.386  
Again, I believe several modifications would be needed to make such an option viable in 
the United States. One problem with LOR options is that they curtail the ability of patentees to 
enforce patents in any context. However, the defensive choices that companies have made 
demonstrate that, to the contrary, patentees do often want to retain the ability to enforce their 
patents.387 Thus, a variant of this approach would limit patentholders’ rights to “defensive-only” 
contexts, in exchange for a discount on the patent’s maintenance fees. Some thinking needs to be 
devoted to fleshing out what “defensive” really means. However, assuming it can be determined, 
the savings could be quite considerable. For a medium-sized company with a portfolio of 1,000 
patents of various ages, 1/3 of which are being renewed in any given year, a 50% discount in fees 
could represent a $1.4M savings in maintenance fee costs.388  
Another departure from current practice concerns permissible changes to the patent’s 
status. In the UK and Germany, patentholders can change the “LOR” status of patents each time 
a maintenance fee is paid. However, in order to enable patentees to rely upon and make 
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investments based on the “defensive-only” status of patents, it is arguably important that 
patentees not be able to change their mind after a patent has taken on “defensive-only” status. 
Clearly, that is the intent of companies like Twitter and Tesla, who have said, respectively, that 
their defensive “promise stays with the patent”389 and “[s]hould Tesla ever transfer a Tesla 
Patent to a third party, it will do so only to a party that agrees, by means of a public declaration 
intended to be binding on such party.”390 Of course, the binding nature of a “defensive-only” 
election must be considered in view of its impact on uptake of the option, especially in light of 
the changing priorities of companies. One could imagine a one-way ratchet, in which patentees 
could elect or default to the “defensive-only” option later in a patent’s life, after the patentee has 
more information about its intent to practice it, but once defensive, a patent could not lose its  
defensive-only status. Extensive testing and further refinement would be needed. Other 
important variables to consider include the definition of “defensive-only” uses and size of the 
discount. 
The salutary effects of “disarming” a large number of patents make these details worth 
considering further. To the extent that society gets the benefit of the patent system– invention 
and disclosure– without the higher costs that come with exclusive rights, defensive-only patents 
may represent the best of both worlds. For those who seek to provide and have freedom of 
action, it would reduce the costs and the risks of participating in the patent system. With a 
defensive intent provided transparently and on the record, it would provide an easier way for 
industries to collectively self-correct and make it easier to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma that 
although, the whole may be better off when all forbear, no individually forbearing firm is better 
off when it acts by itself.  
3. Reconsidering Maintenance Fees 
It is worth exploring further how to calibrate the patent fees patentees pay to keep their 
patents in force after they are issued, to strike the right balance between diffusion and exclusion. 
US patents are a relative bargain, ranking in the bottom third of both fees paid before and after a 
patent is granted,391 and the lowest in the world in relation to total GDP.392 The USPTO’s 
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relatively lower fees are correlated with a relatively higher patent renewal rate. Close to 50% of 
US patents remain in force by their twentieth year, as opposed to about 20% of European 
patents.393 But letting patents lapse hastens their diffusion. Although this topic deserves much 
more discussion than I can afford here, setting USPTO fees based on considerations of diffusion, 
particularly at the end of a patent’s life when the patentee has likely already reaped the reward, 
could hasten this diffusion without undercutting the benefits of exclusion. 
Part V: Conclusion 
The US patent system rewards invention and disclosure with exclusion. But its ultimate aim 
in doing so is to “promote the progress” of the useful arts, through the diffusion of ideas, 
products, and learnings to the public. The nature of innovation is changing, enabling greater 
collaboration and fostering interdependence between innovators. The patent system can support 
the disclosure of technical information, reduce the cost of transacting in technology, and 
facilitate the exchange of permissions in support of freedom to operate. This paper has 
articulated and applied a diffusionary lens to these roles, uncovering several overlooked levers 
for promoting innovation.  
Specifically, to enhance patent disclosure, the USPTO could enable patentees to publish their 
provisional applications, and their utility applications upon filing, rather than waiting until 18-
months after filing. Though current policies are meant to protect innovators from diffusing their 
ideas prior to excluding others, inventors do not always want such protections, the data 
suggests.394 The USPTO could also make it easier for innovators to put their inventions in the 
public domain, for example, by better integrating databases of practice and purposive disclosure 
with patent office searches, and giving patent examiners enough time to search through non-
patent references. The courts or Congress could also do their part, by removing barriers to the 
reading of patents, and the bias against practice embedded in current “marking” law. 
The USPTO and private sector could also further support markets for technology, by making 
it easier for potential patentees and licensees to find each other, and to successfully complete 
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transactions. The USPTO could consider making it easier for patentees who want to waive their 
rights to do so, by creating infrastructure for the recordation of patent waivers that the courts can 
in turn uphold, creating a “defensive-only” fee option, and calibrating maintenance fees.  
As the needs of innovation change, so should the patent system consider doing so, by 
creating more options for innovators to individually tailor the patent system to meet their specific 
needs. By embracing an “all of the above” approach that embraces exclusion and diffusion, the 
patent system can broaden its support for innovation in all forms. 
  
